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PROBING THE SCOPE OF SELF 
DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
EUSTACE CHIKERE AZUBUIKE* 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of self defense is one field of international law that has 
generated, and continues to generate, much controversy. The controversy 
is not as to the legality of self defense, but rather springs from a proper 
identification of the circumstances under which it applies. Thus, the 
International Court of Justice and other tribunals have received criticisms 
from states and academics for a perceived misapplication of the principle 
of self defense. The interpretation of the concept, like other important 
concepts in international law, has not been free from political 
considerations. Does this situation imply that the boundaries of self 
defense are as yet to be determined or cannot be determined? This work 
is set to delineate the scope of self defense in international law. It 
examines the various aspects of self defense and exposes the myriads of 
controversies surrounding this concept that could make or mar the efforts 
at international peace and security. This work will argue that the doctrine 
of anticipatory self defense cannot be inferred from a reading of Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter. 
The article is divided into five parts. The first part traces the origin of the 
doctrine of self defense from the period pre-dating the twentieth century 
up to the League of Nations and moves to the era of the United Nations 
Charter. It also highlights the concept of just and unjust war. Part two 
gives attention to the general rule which prohibits the use of force by 
states. This rule is found in the provision of Article 2(4) of the Charter of 
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the United Nations. It explains the problems that arise from the 
variegated interpretations given to some of the words used in that 
provision. Part three discusses the two regimes of self defense: 
customary international law and the UN Charter. It attempts to show the 
relationship between them and explains the various situations in which 
claims to the right of self defense may be raised. The principle of 
anticipatory self defense, which is a current problem arising from the 
nuances ascribed to the doctrine of self defense, forms the core of part 
four. This part also delves into the debate between advocates of a 
restricted interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter, on the one hand, 
and proponents of its liberal interpretation, on the other hand - a debate 
that has consumed too much space in the literature of international law. 
Part four terminates with some discussion on the preemptive doctrine, a 
relatively new, but controversial aspect of the doctrine of self defense. 
Part five is devoted to collective self defense. It explores some of the 
findings of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case as 
they relate to collective self defense. A conclusion follows. The article 
finds that Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations is limited to 
situations of armed attacks and does not admit of an exercise of the right 
of self defense to ward off an imminent or future attack. It also concludes 
that the Caroline incident does not offer a clear, incontestable ground 
upon which to found the right to anticipatory self defense in international 
law and that even though some states have invoked it under customary 
international law, there is no sufficient indication that that regime of law 
recognizes anticipatory self defense.  
I. SELF DEFENSE IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
A. THE PERIOD BEFORE  THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND UNDER THE 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
Self defense in international law has a very long history and as such, it 
has not been easy to give an accurate account of how the doctrine 
evolved. For many centuries, there were no clear cut regulations on the 
use of force and the conduct of war. Societies resorted to war on every 
perceived provocation, no matter how slight the provocation was. 
However, for the advanced societies resort to war could be had only on 
serious grounds. Thus, the Babylonian Talmud developed a distinction 
between voluntary wars fought with the object of extending territory and 
obligatory wars waged against an enemy displaying some belligerency 
towards Israel or against the seven nations inhabiting Canaan.1 With 
  
 1. The Babylonian Talmud, v (London, 1935) 108; vi (1935) 223. 
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time, war assumed a legal status,2 and there arose a corresponding need 
to regulate its conduct. War became categorized into two: “just war” and 
“unjust war.” This distinction was present in both Ancient Greece and 
Ancient Rome.3 In Ancient Rome, the determination of whether or not a 
foreign state had committed a breach of her duties towards the Romans 
rested on the shoulders of a group of priests called the fetiales. It was the 
practice that any foreign nation that violated her obligations4 towards the 
Romans would, on demand, make reparation for such violation. A refusal 
of the offending state to make reparation would lead the fetiales to certify 
to the Senate that a just cause of war had arisen. 
It has been observed that the notion of just war is a product of 
the Christianization of the Roman Empire and the abandonment 
by Christians of their pacifism.5 With the collapse of the Roman 
Empire, Christian Theology took hold of the concept of just war. 
St. Augustine6 came up with his analysis of the just war concept. 
While condemning conquest, he had this to say of just wars:   
Just wars are usually defined as those which avenge injuries, when the 
nation or city against which war-like action is to be directed has 
neglected either to punish wrongs committed by its own citizens, or to 
restore what has been unjustly taken by it. Further, that kind of war is 
undoubtedly just which God Himself ordains.7 
Implicit in the above comment is that to St Augustine, war could be 
embarked upon only to avenge injuries or to restore what had unjustly 
been dispossessed of a state. Such war must also receive the tacit consent 
of God. Absent these characteristics, there can only be an unjust war. 
St. Thomas Aquinas8 brought some embellishment to the notion of just 
war. He espoused the conditions that a just war should satisfy. In his 
view, apart from the wrongful act of the wrongdoer, there was a need to 
  
 2. See Shih-Tsai Chen, The Equality of  States in Ancient China, 35 A.J.I.L. 641, 648-649 
(1941); Roswell S. Britton, Chinese Interstate Intercourse Before 1700 BC, 29 A.J.I.L. 616, 623 
(1935), for war as a legal institution in China between 722- 481 BC 
 3. See COLEMAN PHILLIPSON 2, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF 
ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME, 179 (London, 1911); ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, 5 (New York, 1962) 
 4. Other bases upon which just war could be begun included violations of the rights of a state, 
infliction of injuries or damage on a state or its citizens. These are akin to present day justifications 
for states to engage in self defense. 
 5. See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 681 (3rd ed., Grotius Publications 
Ltd, Cambridge, 1991) 
 6. AD 354- 430 
 7. Quaestiones in Heptateuchum, vi,  10b 
 8. AD 570- 636 
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punish his guilty mind as well. A just war must be fought by a sovereign 
authority; have been necessitated by a just cause, and be backed by the 
right intentions on the part of the belligerents.9 That is, the intention of 
the belligerents must be to advance good or to avoid evil. 
Just war acquired a new meaning with the rise in Europe of sovereign 
states who began to view the doctrine from individual perspectives.10 The 
result was that there became no objective standard for determining the 
justness of a war. War, therefore, could be just on both sides11 as there 
was no impartial authority to appraise the justice of the cause in 
particular cases. With this state of affairs, the secularization of war 
became inevitable, and this impacted negatively on the international 
plane by posing a threat to international co-existence. A further 
consequence of this development was a shift of emphasis from the use of 
force to suppress wrongdoers to a concern for a peaceful co-existence by 
recourse to peaceful means. There were also attempts to set out the 
circumstances that constituted just causes for war. Here two main 
categories of actions were identified: redress for wrong and defense 
against wrong.12 
Grotius13 entered the scene with his rationalist, secular treatment of just 
war and presented to us a view that was devoid of ideological 
considerations as the basis of just war. He offered a definition of just war 
in terms of self defense, the protection of property, and the punishment 
for wrongs suffered by citizens of a particular state.14 His justification for 
war was on the basis of morality, rather than law. He believed that the 
right to war was the right of self defense which has its root in nature.15 
With the treaties leading to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, there was 
remarkable peace and disappearance of wars in European countries, and 
the concept of just war seemed to have gone into oblivion. The idea of 
  
 9. See Summa Theologica, II, 40; Von Elbe, “The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in 
International Law” 33 A.J.I.L., 669 (1939); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND 
SELF DEFENSE, 62- 63 (Cambridge, 1988) 
 10. See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 540 (Grotius Publications Ltd, 
Cambridge, 1986) 
 11. See ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, Book 1, 48- 52 (1612); Classics of 
International Law, 31- 33 (Translated by John C. Rolfe) 
 12. See Francisco de Victoria, De Indis et de Jure Belli, Second Reflectio, 429, para 13 (1696); 
Francisco Suarez, Selection from Three Works, De Triplica Virtute Theologica, Fide, Spe, et 
Charitate (1621). Suarez maintained that the only just cause for war was a grave injustice which 
could not be avenged or repaired in any other way. 
 13. See Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, 15, Chapter 1 
 14. See MALCOLM SHAW, supra note 10, 541 
 15. See STANIMIR ALEXANDROV, SELF DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 6 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1996) 
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European public peace and public law16 dominated the scene and was to 
translate into a Balance of Power, where all states were sovereign and 
equal,17 and therefore no state had the authority to judge the justness or 
otherwise of the actions of another state. Despite the foregoing, wars did 
occur between states, leading to the invocation of the law of neutrality,18 
which applied between the warring states and third parties. By the 
eighteenth century, the concept of neutrality had been firmly established 
and required neutral states to desist from ascertaining which of the 
warring states had a just cause, except where there was an alliance treaty 
between a neutral and the belligerents.19 But on its part, the positive Law 
of Nations lacked the capacity to inquire into the justice of wars since no 
nation could assume the functions of a judge.20 Only the natural Law of 
Nations was concerned with just causes of wars.21 The natural Law of 
Nations is concerned with the conscience of sovereigns, while the 
positive or voluntary Law of Nations deals with the relationship of 
nations.22 The lawfulness of wars began to be measured on the basis of 
the legality of the means, rather than on the justice of the cause. And so 
the ultimate indicator was a violation of the norms of international law 
and not the intrinsic injustice of the cause of war.23 
With the desuetude of the distinction between just and unjust wars, war 
was freely employed by states, and the right to war became one of the 
attributes of a sovereign nation. No wonder that the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries witnessed large scale wars and conquests in Europe. 
Outside of wars, there were other coercive measures short of war, 
utilized by states in disputes. These hostile measures were in the forms of 
“retorsion” and “reprisal.” Retorsion refers to measures that are 
“unfriendly” but are not prohibited by international law, such as 
severance of diplomatic relations, shutting of ports to vessels of an 
unfriendly state, imposition of travel restrictions or denial of visas for its 
nationals, suspension of foreign aid, trade restrictions not contrary to 
treaty obligations, or the display of naval forces near the waters of an 
  
 16. See OGG, EUROPE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, 5th ed., 175-180, 248-249.  
 17. See MALCOLM SHAW, supra note 10, 541 
 18. The law of neutrality seemed to be predicated on the assumption that the war in question 
was lawful on both sides. In order to qualify for treatment as a neutral, a state had to show an attitude 
of impartiality towards the belligerents. Grotius’ view was that third parties could support the side 
they felt had a just cause. See De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, supra, Chapter XVII. 
 19. See Von Elbe, supra 
 20. See Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, 1749  (The Classsics of International 
Law, 454, Vol. II, para. 888  Oxford, 1934) 
 21. See EMRICH de VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, note 1.29, Book III, Chapter III, 
Para  24 (1758), 3 Classics of International Law, 243 (1916). 
 22. See EMRICH de VATTEL, supra, note 21, 1.29, Book III, Chapter XII, paras 188-189, 
Classics, supra 21, 304-305. 
 23. See Joseph L. Kunz, Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale, 45 A.J.I.L., 528 (1951).  
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unfriendly state.24 Reprisals constitute measures otherwise prohibited by 
international law that are nevertheless justified as responses to prior 
violations. “They are an act of self help on the part of the injured state, 
an act corresponding after an unsatisfied demand to an act contrary to the 
law of nations on the part of the offending state…”25 The resort to these 
measures was subsumed under the function of war as a part of the 
broader concept of defense of a legal right, by war or other forcible 
means short of war, and a remedy against refusal to compensate for a 
violation of a legal right.26 Although there were circumscriptions on the 
right to utilize such measures under international law, it has been 
contended that those limitations are probably best understood in the 
context of balance of power mechanism of international relations that 
largely helped reduce the resort to force in the nineteenth century, or at 
least restrict its application.27 With the broad concept of defense of a 
legal right and all it entailed, it became necessary to draw a clear line 
between self defense, on the one part, and self preservation and self help, 
on the other part. The positivist view of self defense as an inherent right 
went on,28 alongside the absence of an objective determination of the 
justice of it. There was still the view that each state was by tradition 
unrestricted in its freedom to decide what circumstances called for a 
recourse to war in self defense, which reflected in the different standards 
employed by states to ascertain the legality of the resort to self-defense.29 
However, self-defense was finally given some legal recognition in the 
Caroline incident,30 though that incident seemed not to have been 
dispositive of the issue of the distinction between self-defense and self-
preservation.31 Self defense was still treated as coterminous with self 
preservation, and sometimes as an aspect of self-preservation.32 However 
there appears to be a difference between the two concepts. Self 
preservation is broader than self defense, and is associated with the 
  
 24. See Restatement (Third), Sections 203(3) and 905, comment a; Stone, Legal Controls of 
International Conflict 288, Rev. ed. (1959); VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS, 637-640, 6th 
ed. (1992) 
 25. See the Naulilaa Incident, reported in 2 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arab Awards 1011 (1949) 
 26. See STANIMIR ALEXANDROV supra note 15, 11 
 27. See MALCLM SHAW supra note 10, 684 
 28. See JOHN WESTLAKE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE ON 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, note 1.88, 306 (Cambridge, 1914) 
 29. See HERBERT W. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS, 2nd ed., note 1.60, 984-985 
(1952) 
 30. See 2 MOORE DIGEST, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 412 (1906); Hyde, 
International Law, 239 (1945) 
 31. See WESTLAKE, supra, note 28, 1.113, 116-118; CHARLES G. FENWICK, CASES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1951) 
 32. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY 
STATES, 43, 46 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963) 
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security of the state.33 It is observed that to extend the concept of self 
defense to cover self preservation implies giving it a scope that is quite 
inadmissible.34 
War became a last resort in settling disputes between states, after the 
exhaustion of all peaceful measures. The First World War signaled the 
end of the Balance of Power system, and resurrected the ghost of the 
concept of unjust war.35 It equally raised the concern of the international 
community for a peaceful coexistence among nations and to at least 
restrict the resort to war by nations. The result was the emergence of 
numerous peace plans,36 including the League of Nations in 1919. 
The League of Nations was formed principally to prevent the occurrence 
of wars between states, and its Covenant reflected the efforts of the 
drafters to establish machinery that would realize this objective.37 This 
was to be achieved not by a total prohibition of war, but by the provision 
of safeguards against war.38 The Covenant of the League of Nations, by 
placing restrictions on resort to war, derogated from the customary law 
position.39 War, not being generally prohibited, thus was recognized by 
the Covenant as a means of settling disputes.40 But this was only as a last 
resort as states were obligated to submit disputes likely to lead to a 
rupture to arbitration or judicial settlement or inquiry by the Council of 
the League.41 Article 13(4) of the Covenant restricted the resort to war by 
imposing upon member States the obligation not to resort to war against 
a member of the League which complied with an arbitral award or a 
judicial decision. In addition, states were to refrain from resorting to war 
until the expiration of three months following the arbitral award or 
judicial decision or report by the Council.42 One far- reaching change 
brought by the Covenant was that it made any war between states a 
subject of international concern, with the result that “war was no longer 
  
 33. See Oscar Schachter, Self Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 A.J.I.L. 259 (1989); EMRICH 
de VATTEL, supra, note 21, 1.29 
 34. See HUMPHREY WALDOCK, ed, JAMES BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, 6th ed., 
note 1.86, 404 (Oxford 1963) 
 35. See MALCOLM SHAW, supra note 10, 684 
 36. See Hemleben, Plans for World Peace Through Six Centuries, 138-181; WEHBERG, THE 
OUTLAWRY OF WAR, 7-9 (Washington, 1931); LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A TREATISE, 381-382, 2nd ed. (London, 1912) 
 37. See JOHN S. BASSETT, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: A CHAPTER IN WORLD 
POLITICS, 15 (New York, 1930) 
 38. See Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Conference, 201, 319, 692, Vol. III 
(Washington, 1943) 
 39. See IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 32, 56 
 40. See IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 32, 56 
 41. See Article 12 (1), Covenant of the League of Nations 
 42. See MALCOLM SHAW, supra note 10, 684 
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to have the aspect of a private duel, but of a breach of the peace which 
affected the whole community”43. 
So far, it can be seen that the Covenant of the League of Nations 
designed a system of peaceful settlement of disputes, which restricted the 
right to resort to war.44 It also founded a presumption against the legality 
of war as a means of self help implying that war could be employed as a 
means of self defense only where there existed no other means of 
enforcing legal rights.45 Thus, a state was susceptible to sanctions if it 
went to war in violation of Articles 12, 13, and 15.46 In providing for a 
partial prohibition of war, the Covenant47 introduced a new concept in 
international law, namely, a distinction between legal and illegal wars on 
the basis of “the formal criterion of compliance or non compliance with 
obligations to use procedures for pacific settlement of disputes”.48 In 
essence, the Covenant discarded the just-unjust war doctrine. 
Thus, the Covenant of the League of Nations restricted the right to resort 
to war and not the use of force in general. This led to some uncertainty as 
to whether measures short of war were allowed as a means of self-help.49 
However, members of the League of Nations seemed to hold the general 
view that the use of armed force short of war without a first recourse to 
pacific settlement was in violation of the Covenant.50  
The Covenant of the League of Nations did not contain any reservation 
of the right of self defense. The reasons alluded for this were that such a 
  
 43. See IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 32, 56; Article 11 of the Covenant 
 44. See Secretariat of the League of Nations: League of Nations: Ten Years of World 
Cooperation, 19-48 (London, 1930) 
 45. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 15, 32 
 46. See Article 16 of the Covenant. 
 47. See Articles 12, 13, and 15. 
 48. See IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 32, 57 
 49. This uncertainty acted itself out in the bombardment and occupation of Corfu by Italy in 
1923. Following this incident, the Council of the League of Nations set up a Commission of Jurists 
to determine whether coercive measures lacking the character of war were consistent with the 
Covenant when employed without first resorting to arbitration, judicial settlement or conciliation. In 
its report, the Commission stated that “coercive measures which are not intended to constitute acts of 
war may or may not be consistent with the provisions of Articles 12 to 15 of the Covenant”, and 
suggested that the Council should decide in each particular case “whether it should recommend the 
maintenance or the withdrawal of such measures”. See Minutes of the Twenty Eight Session of the 
Council, Sixth Meeting, March 13, 1924, League of Nations Official Journal 524 (1924). See also 
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, ed., LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, 
152, 7th ed., Vol. 2 (1952) 
 50. See WALDOCK supra note 34, 1.86, 412; James L. Brierly, The Prohibition of War by 
International Law, in HERSCH LAUTERPACHT AND C.H.M. WALDOCK, eds., THE BASIS OF 
OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER PAPERS BY ATE JAMES LESLEY 
BRIERLY, 280 (Oxford, 1958) 
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reservation would be unnecessary since self defense is an inherent right,51 
and that an express provision authorizing the use of force in self defense 
is required only “within a legal order which generally prohibits the use of 
force in self-defense”.52 The fact that the Covenant prohibited war only 
under certain circumstances, which did not touch on the right of self 
defense using counter war, implied that resort to war in self defense was 
generally compatible with the Covenant provisions.53 This position still 
could not insulate the scope of the right to self defense from varying 
interpretations.54 
The League of Nations Covenant was replete with many gaps55 in its 
provisions, which led to some indeterminacy as to the prohibition or 
otherwise of war in its ramifications. The international community 
therefore had to search elsewhere for a better system prohibiting war 
completely. This search led to the signing in 1928 of the General Treaty 
for the Renunciation of War (the Kellogg- Briand Pact)56 and ultimately, 
gave birth to the Charter of the United Nations in 1945. 
B. THE PERIOD OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
As earlier noted, the Charter of the United Nations is a product of the 
shortcomings of the previous international documents, such as the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations, in 
providing adequate safeguards against resort to war and the use of force 
short of war. The United Nations Charter was revolutionary in that, for 
the first time, it included a general prohibition of the use of force with 
two exceptions: individual and collective self defense. Article 2(4) of the 
Chapter, which has attained the status of custom in international law, 
  
 51. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 15, 37  
 52. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 15, 37 
 53. See Hans Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self Defense Under the Charter of the 
United Nations, 42 A.J.I.L. 783, 791 (1948); Waldock, supra note 34, 476. In its report to the 
Assembly in 1931, the First Committee had stated as follows: “one point appears beyond dispute- 
namely, that… in the Covenant of the League in its present form… the prohibition of recourse to war 
[does not] exclude the right of legitimate self defense”. See Report to the Assembly by the First 
Committee, Records of the Twelfth Assembly (1931), Meetings of Committees, Minutes of the First 
Assembly, 146 (Annex 18, point 5 of the Report) 
 54. See BOWETT, SELF DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, (1958) 1.44, 124 
 55. For example, Ian Brownlie has noted that the Covenant employed the term “resort to war”, 
which had a restrictive meaning and which could result in an embarrassment to the victim of an act 
of aggression, where the aggressor refrained from declaring war or admitting the existence of a state 
of war. He argues that in such a situation, the victim might appear to be the one violating the 
Covenant if it declared war while acting in self defense. See IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 32, 60. 
Another gap was Article 15 (7) which allowed states to engage in war where the Council failed to 
adopt a unanimous report. Thus, members of the League reserved “to themselves the right to take 
such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice”. 
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provides that: “all members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.” Not only is the use of force prohibited, 
but also its threat. The reference to “force” rather than “war” has been 
viewed as beneficial and as covering situations in which violence is 
employed which falls short of the technical requirements of the state of 
war.57 
The Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States (USA), in 
their proposals58 preliminary to the drafting of the United Nations 
Charter, while advocating for a general prohibition of the use of force 
with the exception of preventive or enforcement action undertaken by the 
organization itself, said nothing about self defense. The non inclusion of 
self defense in these proposals stemmed from the argument that since the 
prohibition of the resort to war under the Covenant of the League of 
Nations was generally believed not to have removed the right of self 
defense, it would not be necessary to expressly reserve the right of self 
defense in those proposals.59 In other words, the prohibition of the threat 
or use of force did not affect the right of self defense, which right was 
considered inherent.60 During the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, China 
exhibited some apprehension over the non-express inclusion of the right 
of self defense in the proposals, especially in relation to the powers of the 
future Security Council. China’s fears were, however, allayed by an 
explanation and assurance that the use of force by a state without the 
authorization of the Security Council would be prohibited, except in 
cases of lawful self defense.61 
At the San Francisco Conference preceding the drafting and adoption of 
the Charter of the United Nations, the issue of the right of self defense 
was heavily deliberated upon, especially the propriety of a specific 
reservation of it in the proposed Charter. States proffered various views 
  
 57. See MALCOLM SHAW, supra note 10, 686. 
 58. See the documents on the proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, China available in 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1944, 614-713, Vol. I (Washington, 1966); RUTH B. 
RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1940-1945, 990-995, Appendix F (Washington, 1958) 
 59. See Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, in Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1944, supra, 890-900 
 60. For the view of the United Kingdom, see Geoffrey L. Goodwin, in BRITAIN AND THE 
UNITED NATIONS, 32-33 (New York, 1957). For the United States’ view, see FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1945, 229-230, Vol. I (Washington, 1967). 
 61. See Antonio Cassese, Article 51, in JEAN- PIERRE COT AND ALLAIN PELET, eds., LA 
CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES, 771, 773-774, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1991) 
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regarding the right.62 The deliberations at the Conference, and other 
proposals and their harmonization, ultimately led to the adoption and 
signing of the UN Charter in 1945, which permits or rather, preserves 
expressly, the inherent right of self defense in its Article 51. 
II. GENERAL PROHIBITION AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE 
A. BACKGROUND 
In line with the central objective of the United Nations to maintain 
international peace and security, states are not allowed to resort to the 
use of force in their international relations. Even in situations of conflict, 
states are required to settle disputes through peaceful means. This is 
provided for in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Despite the prohibition 
against the use of force in international law, states have continued to 
engage in actions that are inconsistent with this general prohibition on 
the pretext that those actions are not within the contemplation of Article 
2(4). This they achieve by proffering an interpretation that is capable of 
defeating the objective of that provision. Article 2(4) has therefore been 
subjected to various interpretations. 
B. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION 
The provision of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations has 
continued to raise definitional problems. Many, if not all, of its key terms 
are susceptible to varying interpretations. However, one thing is clear, 
namely, that Article 2(4) was intended to outlaw war or the employment 
of military force by states to acquire territory. The drafters of the UN 
Charter discarded the term “war,” which had appeared in the Covenant of 
the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and adopted the 
wider term “force.” This choice of word was predicated on the fact that 
during the pre UN Charter period, states usually did engage in hostilities 
that had the trappings of war without declaring a war situation. An 
aggressor could avoid the use of the term “war” even if the victim 
proclaimed that a war situation existed, such as happened in the Anglo-
French invasion of Egypt in 1956 with the help of Israel.63 The reference 
to force rather than war serves a good purpose in that it covers situations 
in which violence is perpetrated which falls short of the technical 
  
 62. Some states advocated for an inclusion in the Charter a provision permitting self defense in 
response to an attack by another state. See the statement of Turkey, UNCIO Documents, Vol. 4, 675.  
New Zealand called for a provision that the member States should undertake a collective obligation 
to “resist every act of aggression against any member”. See Proposal of New Zealand, UNCIO 
Documents, Vol. 3, 486-487; Vol. 6, 342-343 
 63. See UMOZURIKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 201, 3rd ed. 
(Spectrum Books Ltd, Ibadan, 2005) 
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requirements of a state of war.64 “Force,” as one of the key terms adopted 
in Article 2(4), has been subjected to some polysemy. The term can be 
given a very wide interpretation to include all forms of coercion. It 
covers “war of aggression,” “invasion,” attack, and undoubtedly military 
attack and armed attack by the regular military, naval, or air forces of a 
state. It is also argued that based on the principle of attribution, militia 
and security forces, including police forces and forces emanating from 
unofficial or non-state agents, like armed bands, are assimilated in the 
meaning of force under Article 2(4).65 The expression “use of force” as 
contained in Article 2(4) has even been given a sweeping meaning as to 
extend to both the use of arms and a violation of international law, which 
entails a territorial exercise of power, short of the use of arms.66 This 
view, especially the second leg, is in no way supported by even a 
generous interpretation of Article 2(4). Implicit in the second aspect of 
this view, which is championed by Kelsen, is that any act or conduct by a 
state on the territory of another state, which constitutes a violation of 
international law, amounts to use of force under Article 2(4). This would 
be taking that provision to a ridiculous height that is beyond the reach of 
the UN Charter. 
Attempts have been made to use the term “force” to embrace all kinds of 
coercion, including economic and physical coercion.67 When Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter was being drafted, Brazil presented a proposal for the 
inclusion of a prohibition against the use of “economic measures” against 
a state. The proposal was rejected.68 Two possible conclusions could be 
drawn from the rejection of that proposal. The one is that it could imply 
that economic aggression was not within the scope of “force;” the other 
is that “force” was wide enough to cover it, thereby rendering an express 
mention of it unnecessary.69 There are international documents 
prohibiting the use by states of economic measure or coercion on another 
state.70 The existence of these documents could be a basis upon which to 
  
 64. See MALCOLM SHAW, supra note 10, 686 
 65. See IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 32, 361. 
 66. See Kelsen, Collective Security Under International Law, International Law Studies, US 
Naval War College, 57 
 67. See SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 110-113 
(1991) 
 68. See 6 Docs. Of the U.N. Conf. on Int’l Org. 335 
 69. On this reasoning, see GOODRICH HAMBRO and SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS, 49, 3rd ed. (1969) 
 70. For example, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law required states to 
“refrain… from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the 
political independence or territorial integrity of any state”; the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States, approved by the General Assembly in 1974, provided that “no state may use or 
encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another state in 
order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights”; the International 
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found an argument that the use of economic pressures against a state, 
especially when the motive is to induce a change in the policy of that 
state, is inconsistent with the UN Charter.71 Another dimension of the 
definitional problem posed by Article 2(4) is whether “force” includes 
indirect force used by a state against another state, for example where a 
state allows its territory to be used by troops fighting in another country, 
or in cases of indirect aggression, where a state lends military or other 
assistance to one or the other side in time of war. The weight of opinion 
tends to be that force embraces both direct and indirect force used against 
another state.72 However, with regard to aid given to rebel forces, 
Brownlie identifies a distinction between situations where the rebels are 
“effectively supported and controlled by another state,” and “cases in 
which aid is given but there is no agency established, and there is no 
exercise of control over the rebels by the foreign government.” He argues 
that while the former qualifies as a use of force, it is very doubtful if the 
same could be said of the latter.73 This view seems to represent the 
“effective control” test adopted by the International Court of Justice in 
the Nicaragua case, where the Court, after finding that the United States’ 
assistance to rebels seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan government 
constituted violations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, refused to 
attribute all the actions of the rebels to the United States’ government, 
arguing that there was no basis for the attribution as Nicaragua had failed 
to prove that the United States directly and effectively controlled their 
actions.74 But in the Tadic case, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia rejected the “effective control” test as adopted by 
the court in the Nicaragua case and adopted a lower standard in 
attributing the conduct of a paramilitary group to a foreign government 
that had given it substantial support.75 
Article 2(4) makes reference to the use of force “against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” This poses yet 
another problem of interpretation. Are these words to be given a 
  
Covenants on Human Rights adopted in 1966 provided for the right of all peoples to freely pursue 
their economic, social, and cultural development. 
 71. See The Arab Oil Incident discussed in LILLICH, (ED) ECONOMIC COERCION AND 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, (1976), and PAUST and BLAUSTEIN, 
(EDS) THE ARAB OIL WEAPON, (1977). 
 72. See Schachter, supra note 67 110-113; FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 262 (1964); Ian Brownlie, supra, 370; The 1952 Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Question of Defining Aggression, U.N. Doc. A/221 (Oct. 3, 1952) 
 73. See Ian Brownlie, supra note 32, 370 
 74. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States) 1986 I.C.J. 14 103-123 
 75. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, I.C.T.Y. Case No. IT-94-1-A, 38 I.L.M. 1518, Judgment on 
Appeal from Conviction (July 15, 1999) 
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restrictive interpretation, so as to allow the use of force that does not 
directly impinge on the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of a 
state, provided it is not inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations, or is the phrase to be interpreted liberally to cover every use of 
force against a state? There is a good consensus of academic opinion in 
support of the latter view. Brownlie has argued that to give the words a 
plain meaning is of little value, as “political independence and territorial 
integrity” is all encompassing and accommodates the totality of legal 
rights a state has.76  Schachter, in defense of the broad interpretation of 
Article 2(4), observes that a textual interpretation of the qualifying words 
in Article 2(4), would in no small measure whittle down the scope of its 
provision. Noting that the only exceptions to the general prohibition of 
the use of force are Article 51 provision of self defense and military 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII, he submits that every 
“coercive incursion of armed troops into a foreign state without its 
consent impairs that state’s territorial integrity, and any use of force to 
coerce a state to adopt a particular policy or action must be considered as 
an impairment of that state’s political independence.”77 The underlying 
element in this view is the issue of consent. It implies that any use of 
force against a state without its consent and which does not fall under the 
Charter exceptions, whether or not such force is consistent with the 
purposes of the UN, is a violation of Article 2(4). But, it is doubtful if 
use of force can be consistent with the purposes of the UN if it does not 
constitute an exception under the Charter. 
A restrictive interpretation of the qualifying words used in Article 2(4) 
was adopted by the United Kingdom in the Corfu Channel case,78 where 
it argued that its employment of force in entering the Albanian waters to 
recover evidence that might give a clue as to who was responsible for the 
destruction of two British warships by mines was not in violation of 
Article 2(4) because its action “threatened neither the territorial integrity 
nor the political independence of Albania,” and that “Albania suffered 
thereby neither territorial loss nor any part of its independence.” The ICJ 
rejected this contention, and held that it “can only regard the alleged 
right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as 
has, in the past, given rise to serious abuses and such as cannot … find a 
place in international law.” 
  
 76. See Ian Brownlie, supra, note 32, 268 
 77. See Schachter, supra note 67, 110-113; LORI F. DAMROSCH, et al, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1147, 5th ed.  (West Publishing Company, Minnesota, 2009) 
 78. See ICJ Reports, 1949, 4, 35 
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There have also been attempts by states to project the view that Article 
2(4) allows the use of force in circumstances where the machinery of the 
United Nations is ineffective79 or for the realization of other values 
recognized by the UN Charter.80 The conclusion to be drawn from a 
plethora of academic opinions seems to be that any use of force by a state 
against another state, which is not justified under the Article 51 and 
Chapter VII exceptions, is a violation of Article 2(4). 
C. THREAT OF FORCE 
Threat of force is prohibited under Article 2(4). But while it may be easy 
to identify the circumstances involving the actual use of force, it is 
always difficult to find cases of threat of force. A threat of force exists 
when there is an “express or implied promise by a government of a resort 
to force conditional on non-acceptance of certain demands of that 
government. If the promise is to resort to force in conditions in which no 
justification for the use of force exists, the threat itself is illegal.”81 Threat 
of force is the precursor of anticipatory self defense, and its existence can 
only be determined from the circumstances of a particular case. This 
determination is not easy to make owing to the interplay of power 
relations and the difficulty of demonstrating coercive intent.82 The 
imbalance of power among states thrusts upon international law the 
challenge of properly delineating threat of force. This disparity is most 
evident in the possession of nuclear weapons by bigger powers. Such 
capabilities on the part of bigger states tend to constitute a threat of the 
use force on the weaker states. In some situations, such stronger powers 
go to the extent of declaring that they possess certain weapons and that 
they would not hesitate in using them in self defense against any state 
violating their territorial integrity or political independence. In the 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapon,83 the ICJ was faced with a determination of whether or not such 
declaration of intention to use force upon the occurrence of certain 
events amounts to a “threat” within Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter. The 
court made the following observation:  
  
 79. Israel was involved in this argument in 1976 concerning the Entebbe Incident, in addition 
to its defense of self defense. See Malcolm Shaw, supra note  10, 696 
 80. This was one of the grounds raised by the United States in defending its attacks on 
Grenada and Panama in 1984 and 1989 respectively. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, 31, 77, 127, 293, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2004) 
 81. See Ian Brownlie, supra note 32, 364 
 82. See Schachter, supra, note 10, 111 
 83. 1996  I.C.J. 226 
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The notions of ‘threat’ and ‘use’ of force under Article 2, paragraph 4 of 
the Charter stand together in the sense that if the use of force itself in a 
given case is illegal- for whatever reason- the threat to use such force 
will likewise be illegal. In short, if it is to be lawful, the declared 
readiness of a state to use force must be a use of force that is in 
conformity with the Charter.84  
This seems to represent the true position. 
III. SELF DEFENSE UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE UN CHARTER 
A. BACKGROUND 
The right of self defense is one of the exceptions to the general 
prohibition of the use of force in international law. This right is 
recognized both under customary international law and the UN Charter. 
In fact, it has its root in the former, and it has always been argued that 
what the latter did was to codify the right, which existed long before the 
establishment of the United Nations. Like other concepts of international 
law, the right to self defense is susceptible to differing interpretations by 
states. Its real boundaries seem to elude the international community. 
Each state, when involved in a case touching on the right of self defense, 
supports the interpretation that will protect its interest. Even though there 
are laid down standards that an action founded on the exercise of the 
right of self defense should meet, some indeterminacy still exists in 
appraising whether or not these standards are met in a particular case. 
This is owing to the fact that the circumstances or events, in the forms of 
attacks or threats that trigger the right of self defense, vary. Despite the 
foregoing, the right to self defense has attained the status of jus cogens in 
international law, and both the customary law and UN Charter are 
relevant in a consideration of this right. 
B. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The right to self defense is founded on the natural law theory, which 
gave each state the right to defend itself in the face of a grave threat to its 
  
 84. On the issue of whether or not the possession of nuclear weapons is itself an unlawful 
threat to use force, the court held that, that depends on the purpose to which the weapons are 
intended, that is, “whether the particular use of force intended would be directed against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of a state, or against the Purposes of the United 
Nations, or whether, in the event that it were intended as a means of  defense, it would necessarily 
violate the principles of necessity and proportionality. In any of these circumstances, the use of 
force, and the threat to use it, would be unlawful under the law of the Charter”. 
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power or way of life.85 This right was considered natural and as a 
component of the powers of a state. Some scholars have on this basis, 
maintained that Article 51 of the UN Charter reflects this right by its use 
of “inherent right”.86 Thus, states could wage war according to their 
whims and caprices. There was no international law limitation on a 
state’s right to go to war. The only control was internal. This posed some 
difficulty in establishing a functional international law rule regarding a 
state’s right to self defense. This traditional approach to the right of self 
defense was broad in outlook. Although at a later time, war became 
outlawed as an instrument of international policy, as evident in the 
League of Nations Covenant of 1919 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1928, the right to self defense was “so firmly established in international 
law that it was automatically exempted from the Kellogg- Briand Pact 
without any mention of it.”87 However, in a diplomatic correspondence 
before the coming into effect of the Pact, the United Kingdom clearly 
indicated that it did not oppose the right of self defense, which was 
viewed as right to defend security interests in any part of the British 
Empire.88 But the situation changed with the drafting of the UN Charter, 
which while prohibiting the use of force and not just war, affirmed the 
right of self defense as one that is not impaired by the general prohibition 
of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter. 
The concept of self defense under customary international law received 
some formal content and recognition in the Caroline incident.89 It 
established that self defense should be limited to cases in which the 
“necessity of that self defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no 
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”90 Moreover, an action 
taken in pursuance of self defense must not be unreasonable or excessive, 
“since the act, justified by the necessity of self defense, must be limited 
by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.”91 In modern times, the 
conditions for the exercise of the customary law right of self defense 
have crystallized into a more concise form – the requirements of 
  
 85. See Donald Nungesser, United States’ Use of the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self Defense in 
Iraqi Conflicts, 16 Pace Int’l Law Rev. 193, at 195 (2004) 
 86. See Schachter, supra note 10, 135 
 87. See Leo Van den hole, Anticipatory Self Defense Under International Law, 19 American 
University Int’l Law Rev., 69. at 75 (2003) 
 88. See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, (ed.), OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TREATISE, Vol. I, Disputes, War and Neutrality, 187, 7th ed. (1952) 
 89. See 2 MOORE, DPGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 412 (1906); HYDE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 239 (1945); Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 A.J.I.L., 82 
(1938). For its notoriety under international law, an elaborate discussion of the facts of the Caroline 
Incident is dispensed with here. 
 90. See Moore, supra note 88, 412 
 91. See Malcolm Shaw, supra note 10, 692 
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necessity and proportionality.92 This means that for the right to avail a 
state, it must first show, not only that the defensive action taken by it is 
necessary to protect itself or its citizens, but also that the action is 
proportional to the attack being defended.93  Measures taken in self 
defense must be proportionate to the seriousness and scope of the attack. 
Since retaliation and punitive actions are not permitted, the actions are 
restricted to those necessary to repulse the attack.  
The coming into effect of Article 51 of the UN Charter has triggered 
some controversy as to the proper scope of the right to self defense, 
especially in relation to customary law. Does Article 51 differ from 
customary international law? In other words, did the drafters of the UN 
Charter intend to limit the pre-existing right to only cases of armed 
attack?94 One side of the argument is that Article 51, together with 
Article 2(4), renders all use of force illegal, except in the exercise of the 
right of self defense if an “armed attack occurs”, and in no other 
circumstances.95 The other side of the argument holds the view that the 
wording of Article 51 – “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack 
occurs” – is a testimony of the fact that there is still in existence a 
customary international law right of self defense beyond that provided in 
Article 51.96 On this score, the view has been held that the UN Charter 
only recognizes the inherent right of self defense, and does not go on to 
regulate all aspects of the right.97 The pre-conditions under Article 51 for 
the exercise of the inherent right seem too vague to found an assumption 
that the drafters of Article 51 intended to substitute the customary right 
of self defense with a statutory one.98 The advocates of this second view 
fortify themselves with the point that the right of self defense is an 
inherent right bestowed on states under customary law, and that Article 
  
 92. See MYRE  McDOUGAL  & FLORENTINO FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 217 (1961) 
 93. In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. 168, para. 147, the court in holding that the preconditions for the exercise of the 
right to self defense were not satisfied, stated as follows: “The court cannot fail to observe, however, 
that the taking of airports and towns many hundreds of kilometers from Uganda’s border would not 
seem proportionate to the series of transborder attacks it claimed had given rise to the right of self 
defense, nor to be necessary to that end”. See also Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. 138, 195, para. 140 
 94. This issue basically turns on whether Article 51 should be given restrictive or broad 
interpretation 
 95. See Ian Brownlie, supra note 32, 265 
 96. See Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 166 HR, 6, 231-237; 
O’Connell, International Law, 3127, 2nd ed., vol. I (1970) 
 97. See Timothy McCormack, Self Defense in International Law – The Israeli Raid on the 
Iraqi Nuclear Reactor , 119 (1996) 
 98. See Myres McDougal, The Soviet – Cuban Quarantine and Self Defense, 57 Am. J. Int’l. 
Law 597, 599- 600 
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51 provision was an afterthought and was not part of the original drafts 
of the Charter. It found its way into the Charter relatively late through the 
traveaux leading to the adoption of the Charter and was a product of the 
concerns expressed by Latin American States who had sought for a 
guarantee of the legality of regional collective self defense arrangements, 
such as the Act of Chapultepec.99 
The International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case100 held that the 
right to self defense is one that exists as an inherent or natural right under 
customary international law and under the UN Charter.101 The two 
contrasting views held by scholars as to the proper scope of the right of 
self defense under international law are both built on strong arguments. It 
would therefore be safe to contend that Article 51 is not a comprehensive 
provision on the right of self defense; rather it renders just an aspect of 
that right, leaving the other aspects under the regulation of customary 
international law. This conclusion appears reasonable, since Article 51 
only recognizes the inherent right of self defense in cases of “armed 
attack” and neither expressly abrogates nor incorporates the other 
components of that right. This means a co-existence of customary 
international law and the UN Charter – a position that is in accord with 
the Nicaragua judgment. 
C. UN CHARTER 
(i) The Duty to Report to the Security Council 
Article 51 of the UN Charter states that: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs 
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international 
peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise 
of this right of self defense shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority 
  
 99. See Gill T, The Temporal Dimension of Self Defense: Anticipation, Preemption, Prevention 
and Immediacy, 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 361,  363 (2006) 
 100. 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103- 123 
 101. The court, while recognizing the reservations in the United States’ declarations in its 
acceptance of the court’s compulsory jurisdiction, the effect of which robbed the court of jurisdiction 
over the United States under the UN Charter, but not under customary international law, stated that “ 
Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is a ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ right of 
self defense and it is hard to see how this can be other than of customary nature, even if its present 
content has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter… It cannot, therefore be held that Article 
51 is a provision which ‘subsumes and supervenes’ customary international law”. 
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and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in 
order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
The purport of this provision is that any state which has acted in self 
defense has an obligation to report its actions to the Security Council. 
While the existence of this obligation is indisputable, it is not clear 
whether this obligation is mandatory or directory. In other words, can the 
lawfulness of an action taken in exercise of the right to self defense be 
affected by the failure of a state to report such action to the Security 
Council? There is no authoritative ground to hold that the Article 51 
reporting requirement is mandatory. However the judgment of the I.C.J. 
in the Nicaragua case can offer some lead in this regard. The court, while 
noting that the requirement to report measures taken in self defense to the 
Security Council pursuant to Article 51 does not constitute a part of 
customary international law, held that “the absence of a report may be 
one of the factors indicating whether the state in question was itself 
convinced that it was acting in self defense.”102 The court was of the view 
that where the plea of self defense is raised to justify actions which 
would otherwise be in violation of both customary international law and 
the UN Charter, it is to be expected that the provisions of the Charter 
should be observed. However, the court failed to determine whether, if 
the Charter provisions were applicable, a non-compliance with the 
reporting requirement vitiates the action taken in self defense. The effect 
of the pronouncement of the I.C.J. is that a failure on the part of a state to 
adhere to this reporting requirement would affect the genuineness of a 
state’s claim to be acting in self defense.103 This view had been accorded 
recognition by states even before the Nicaragua case. During the 
Vietnam conflict in 1964, the United States took some military actions 
purportedly in self defense against Vietnam in reaction to alleged attacks 
by North Vietnam. The United States lodged a report of its self defensive 
actions with the Security Council in line with the provision of Article 51. 
The United Kingdom observed that the gesture exhibited by the United 
States in reporting to the Security Council was evidence that it was 
actually acting in self defense.104 Following the conflict involving Libya 
and the United States in the Gulf of Sirte in 1986, it was the contention 
of the United States that the failure of Libya to report its actions to the 
  
 102. Nicaragua case, supra note 100, para. 2000 
 103. See CHRISTINE GRAY, supra note 80, 102 
 104. See 1964 UNYB 147 
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Security Council was an indication that its actions were not in self 
defense.105 
State practice shows that states still adhere to the reporting requirement 
and tend to interpret Article 51 as requiring continuing reports, especially 
in cases of prolonged conflicts.106 It would seem that even if the 
requirement of Article 51 is more than directory, it is not mandatory, 
although practice reveals some consistency of obedience by states to this 
requirement. Thus, the reporting requirement is merely procedural, and a 
failure by a state to comply with the provision does not in itself 
invalidate a claim to self defense. 
(ii) Self Defense as a Temporary Measure 
A state, which is a victim of armed attack, is entitled to exercise its 
inherent right of self defense until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. This 
provision presupposes that the right to self defense remains exercisable 
so long as the Security Council has not taken any of its authorized 
measures. In other words, the right becomes extinguished and is spent, as 
soon as the Security Council takes measures necessary to restore 
international peace and security. The reporting requirement discussed 
above is a “prelude to action of some sort by the Security Council that 
would bring to an end the need for the state, which has been a victim of 
an armed attack, to continue to exercise its right of self-defense.”107 This 
shows that the right of self defense is a provisional measure. The UN 
Charter provides for a centralized system of use of force and thus appears 
to have clothed the Security Council with the power to decide when 
measures terminating the right to self defense have been taken. While a 
state decides whether or not to use force in exercise of the right of self 
defense, the rightness of its decision is determined by the United 
Nations.108 However, a pertinent issue here is what would be the position 
when the measures taken by the Security Council to maintain 
international peace and security prove ineffective? Would such measures 
  
 105. See S/PV 2671; S/17938; S/PV 2668 
 106. In the period of the conflict between Iraq and Iran in 1980- 1988, both countries were 
involved in this piece-meal reporting to the Security Council. Similarly, in the Falklands conflict 
between the United Kingdom and Argentina, the two countries reported individual incidents of self 
defense to the Security Council. See CHRISTINE GRAY, supra note 80, 103. Some writers, 
however, are of the view that the reporting requirement has not always been observed by states. See 
Schachter, Self Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 A.J.I.L. 259, at 263 (1989); Jean Combacau, The 
Exception of Self Defense in U.N. Practice, in ANTONIO CASSESE, ed., THE CURRENT LEGAL 
REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE, 9, at 15  (Dordrecht, 1986) 
 107. See Omar Abubakar Bakhashab, The Relationship Between the Right of Self Defense on the 
Part of States and the Powers of the Security Council, Vol. 9 JKAU: Econ & Adm., 3-28, at 4 (1996) 
 108. See Waldock, supra note 96, 495 
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only have the effect of putting in abeyance a state’s right of self defense, 
which the state was exercising prior to the intrusion of these measures, 
which have proved ineffective, and as such, would entitle the state to 
revive its right to self defense? A state may claim that measures 
employed by the Security Council lack the potency necessary to maintain 
international peace and security, and therefore cannot be said to have 
terminated their right to self defense. Following the Argentine invasion 
of the United Kingdom colonial territory during the Falklands conflict in 
1981, the UN Security Council found that a breach of the peace had 
occurred and passed Resolution 502 (10-1-4), calling for immediate 
cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of all Argentine forces. It also 
called on the two parties, Argentina and the United Kingdom, to seek 
diplomatic solution to their conflict. The United Kingdom contended that 
the action of the Security Council did not qualify as “necessary measures 
to maintain international peace and security,” which terminated its right 
to self defense against Argentina, since Argentina remained in 
occupation of the Falklands.109 Once the Security Council has decided 
that the measures it has taken to maintain international peace in a case of 
armed attack are appropriate, a state is expected to accept such decision 
and stop the exercise of its right to self defense. This is because only the 
Security Council has the competence to determine whether it has taken 
the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security, and 
ipso facto, whether the exercise of the right to self defense has to stop.110 
(iii) Security Council Measures and Self Defense  
The UN Charter in Article 51 recognizes the right of a state to self 
defense, while Chapter VII gives the Security Council certain powers 
with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression. The powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII 
sometimes infringe on a state’s right to self defense, despite the proviso 
in Article 40 that the measures taken by the Security Council pursuant to 
Article 39 shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, and positions 
of the states, which no doubt, include the right of self defense. How are 
these two provisions to be reconciled? The measures taken by the 
Security Council in exercise of its Chapter VII powers have at one point 
or the other been criticized and even rejected by states as violating their 
right to self defense granted by Article 51. In a majority of the cases, the 
Security Council has not been swayed by this argument and thus has 
sustained its actions taken under Chapter VII. But in some very few 
instances, it has heeded calls by some states for a suspension of a 
  
 109. See 1982 UNYB 132 
 110. See Stanimir Alexandrov, supra note 15, 1050 
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particular measure taken by it, which it has considered appropriate to set 
aside as an intrusion into the state’s right of self defense. In 1951, Egypt, 
despite the conclusion of an armistice agreement between it and Israel, 
invoked its right of self defense in reaction to the restrictions imposed on 
the passage of goods to Israel through the Suez Canal. In support of its 
action, it argued that the armistice agreement did not end the state of 
belligerency, thus entitling it to self-defense.111 The Security Council, in 
its Resolution, rejected this argument.112 However, in disregard to the 
Resolution of the Security Council, Egypt did not withdraw its 
interference with the goods being shipped to Israel, a situation which, in 
1954, led Israel to request the Security Council to “confirm and reinforce 
its earlier Resolution.”113 Egypt, again, contended that the earlier 
Resolution of the Security Council could not put a stop to the exercise of 
its right of self defense.114 Like the previous one, the Security Council 
rejected this argument.115 
The relationship between a state’s right of self defense under Article 51 
and the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII was the 
subject of consideration during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in 
1991. Following the conflict, the Security Council, in exercise of its 
Chapter VII powers, had placed an arms embargo on the entire 
Yugoslavia with the consent of the government of Yugoslavia, by 
passing Resolution 713.116 Upon its attainment of self government and 
becoming a member of the United Nations, Bosnia- Herzegovina 
challenged the arms embargo, claiming that it contravened its right to 
self defense under Article 51 and placed Bosnia-Herzegovina in a 
precarious position as the embargo deprived it of weapons to defend 
itself from its enemies as it could neither acquire arms nor call on other 
states to assist it militarily. Furthermore, it argued that its right to self 
defense under Article 51 had overriding effect over the embargo, and that 
  
 111. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 213-216 (Oxford, 1963) 
 112. In its Resolution, the Security Council remarked that the armistice agreement, which had 
existed for almost two and a half years, was of a permanent character, thereby disentitling both 
parties to the exercise of right of self defense. It noted that the action of Egypt could not, in the 
prevailing circumstances, be justified on the ground that it was necessary for self defense.  See Res. 
S/2322, September 1, 1951. 
 113. See Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1952-1955, 161 (United Nations, 
New York, 1956), UN Doc. ST/PSCA/1/Add.1. 
 114. Egypt posited that: “Self defense may not be overridden in favor of the Security Council 
except in so far as the states concerned are so well protected by the resources available to the 
Security Council that the abandonment of their right of self defense will not harm them”. See 
Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1952-1955, supra, 161 
 115. The Security Council held that its earlier Resolution was still valid, and continued to have 
effect. See Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Suppl. No.1, Vol. 1, at 361 (United 
Nations, New York, 1958); 10 SCOR, 687th and 688th Meetings (January 4 and January 13, 1955) 
 116. See UN Doc. S/Res. 713 (1991) 
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the right could not be exercised without the lifting of the embargo. In the 
light of these assertions, Bosnia-Herzegovina sought the lifting of the 
embargo by the Security Council. The Security Council refused to accept 
this argument and thus did not lift the arms embargo.117 Bosnia-
Herzegovina took out proceedings against Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) before the I.C.J., requesting the court to lift the arms 
embargo. The court held that it lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the 
claim.118 
On the other hand, during the crisis in Rwanda, the Security Council 
imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda in 1994. But unlike the case of 
Yugoslavia, the embargo was not with the consent of the then 
government of Rwanda. The purpose of the embargo was to forestall 
further violence. In response to calls on it by Rwanda to lift the arms 
embargo, the Security Council accepted the argument of Rwanda; the 
argument was similar to that raised by Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
Yugoslavia conflict. The Security Council, after a consideration of the 
reports of military invasion of Rwanda by the supporters of the former 
government, lifted the embargo. But the lifting of the arms embargo was 
only in relation to arms designated for the government of Rwanda, and 
not otherwise.119 It would seem that what weighed heavily on the mind of 
the Security Council in lifting the embargo in Rwanda were the military 
attacks on Rwanda from outside forces that were rendering aid to the 
former government. There was therefore the need for Rwanda to exercise 
its right of self defense, which it could only exercise by having the 
embargo lifted. 
The Security Council jealously guards its powers under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, and thus cannot readily succumb to any argument that 
the imposition of arms embargo pursuant to the exercise of its Chapter 
VII powers infringes on a state’s right of self defense under Article 51. 
This position makes sense, considering the fact that a contrary view 
would weaken the power of the Security Council in maintaining 
international peace and security. If states are allowed the contention that 
the right of self defense under Article 51 supersedes the powers of the 
  
 117. Members of the Security Council who favored the lifting of the embargo raised the 
following argument. First, that the accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the United Nations 
superseded the embargo. Second, that the Resolution containing the embargo should be interpreted 
as not having application on Bosnia-Herzegovina and, third, that assuming the Resolution applied to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, then the Resolution was invalid as it was beyond the powers of the Security 
Council because it infringed upon the right to self defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina. See Christine 
Gray, supra, 106 
 118. See The International Court of Justice, in Application of the Convention  on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Provisional Measures) I.C.J. Reports 1993, 3, 325 
 119. See 1994 UNYB 281; 1995 UNYB 370, at 380, SC Res 1011. 
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Security Council under Chapter VII, there will be no limit to the extent to 
which states under an embargo will take this argument and that will 
jeopardize the collective security system of the United Nations. There is, 
no doubt, some veracity in the assertion that “an arms embargo may 
affect the right to self defense but does not actually deny that right.”120 
D. SELF DEFENSE AND AGGRESSION  
It is not so clear whether or not acts of aggression could give rise to the 
exercise of the right to self defense, that is, whether it is equated to 
armed attack. The Charter of the United Nations employed the term 
“armed attack” rather than “aggression” to describe the acts that can 
trigger the exercise of the right of self-defense.121 There had been several 
attempts to define “aggression” during the period of the League of 
Nations122 and after the adoption of the UN Charter.123 A proposal to 
include a definition of aggression in the UN Charter at the San Francisco 
Conference was rejected by the United States, which had maintained that 
no definition of aggression in the Charter could be so comprehensive as 
to cover all cases of aggression and have the capacity to envisage the 
various situations which might come into play in the determination of 
aggression in a particular case.124 This view was accepted. The debate on 
the definition of aggression in the United Nations represented two major 
approaches. While some states favored an enumerative definition that 
would contain a list of the acts that constitute aggression, others 
suggested a general definition similar to that contained in Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter.125 These approaches had implications on the relationship 
between aggression and armed attack. The acts listed under the 
enumerative approach as qualifying as acts of aggression are comparable 
to armed attacks. The second approach, which seemed to have adopted 
the definition in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter considered aggression as 
any illegal use of force, that is, any use of force which is not in exercise 
of the right to self defense against an armed attack under Article 51 or 
  
 120. See CHRISTINE GRAY, supra note 80, 107 
 121. See Stanimir Alexandrov, supra note 15, 106; Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
 122. See Bengt Broms, The Definition of Aggression, 154 Hague Recueil 299, 305-312 (1977); 
Ian Brownlie, supra note 32, 351- 355; BENJAMIN FERENEZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL 
AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE, A Documentary History and Analysis, Vol. 
1 ( Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1975) 
 123. The Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974) 
in Article 1 defines aggression as “the use of armed force by a state against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations…” Article 3 goes on to enumerate some of the acts, which 
qualify as acts of aggression. 
 124. See LORI DAMROSCH, et al, supra note 77, 1153 
 125. See Broms, Bengt, supra note 122, 299, 386 
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which does not amount to coercive action by the United Nations.126 An 
attempt to add the concept of economic aggression as falling under the 
definition of aggression was vehemently criticized as liable to extend the 
concept to indefinite limits. It was rejected also because of its implication 
on the right of self defense, in that states could readily raise a claim to 
the right of self defense against economic coercion.127 Not surprisingly, 
economic coercion was not included in the 1974 Definition of 
Aggression, although several resolutions of the General Assembly have 
condemned it as undermining sovereign rights of states.128 The meaning 
ascribed to aggression in the 1974 Definition of Aggression seems to 
suggest that there is a correlation between aggression and self defense. 
But it has been observed that this view overlooks the fact that armed 
attack and self defense, on the one hand, and aggression, on the other 
hand, are used differently in the UN Charter, in the sense that the 
definition of aggression is more relevant in the determination of the 
circumstances under which the Security Council could invoke its powers 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to maintain or restore international 
peace and security, while self defense consists mainly in identifying the 
circumstances under which a state may use force to defend itself from 
armed attack.129 Because of the interrelatedness of aggression and armed 
attack, especially as can be gleaned from the definition of the former in 
the Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, and the fact that most 
acts of aggression are carried out with the aid of arms and weapons, even 
if it is accepted that some acts of aggression, such as economic 
  
 126. See Stephen Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self Defense in Modern International 
Law, 136 Hague Recueil 411, at 439 (1972-II). There were however, other proposals, which tended 
to define aggression as direct and indirect use of force, and as including indirect aggression, which 
covered economic aggression. See the proposals of China contained in (UN Doc. A/AC.66/L.4/Rev. 
3, Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 9 GAOR, Suppl. No. 
11, UN Doc. A/2638, at 14, and UN Doc. A/C.6/L.336/Rev.1 and 3, 9 GAOR, Annexes, Item 51, at 
7-8); the proposals of Paraguay, UN Doc. A/C. 6/L.334/Rev.1 and UN Doc. A/AC.77/L.7, Report of 
the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 12 GAOR, Suppl. No. 16, UN Doc. 
A/3574, Annex II, at 31); UN Doc. A/2211, at 58 (Oct. 3, 1952).  
 127. See Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, Aug. 24- 
Sept. 21, 1953, 9 GAOR, Suppl. No. 11, UN Doc. A/2638, at 8-10; Report of the Sixth Committee, 
Dec. 2, 1954, UN Doc. A/2806, 9 GAOR, Annexes, Item 51, at 10-12. 
 128. See, for example, Article 32 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. 
Res. 3281(XXIX) (Dec. 12, 1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975); Declaration of the Principles 
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, G.A. Res. 2625 
(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of 
States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX) (Dec. 21, 
1965) 
 129. See STANIMIR ALEXANDROV, supra note 15, 113-14. 
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aggression, cannot give rise to self defense, it would seem that most acts 
of aggression would implicate the right of self defense.130 
E. SELF DEFENSE AGAINST ACTUAL ARMED ATTACKS 
While it can be said that there is unanimity of opinion among states on 
the recognition of the right of self defense against armed attack under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, a similar assertion cannot be made in 
reference to the definition of armed attack. Nowhere in the Charter is the 
concept of armed attack defined, and during the San Francisco 
Conference states thought there was no need to render a definition of the 
concept, perhaps due to the view that the concept was sufficiently clear 
and self-evident.131 But recent events have proved this argument 
unhelpful. A determination of what constitutes armed attack in order to 
entitle states to the right of self defense is necessary in view of the 
development of different forms of weapons by states and the 
corresponding need to categorize the weapons.132 There was a view that 
for an attack to ground the exercise of the right of self defense under 
Article 51, it must be so serious as to threaten the inviolability of the 
victim state.133 Another view was that a single shot from a rifle fired by 
an armed soldier across the border of a country could amount to an 
armed attack.134 At the San Francisco Conference, an attempt was made 
to define the concept of armed attack, especially as it relates to the right 
of self defense, from two approaches. These approaches were that while 
an armed attack should result in only the exercise of collective self 
defense, the exercise of individual self defense should not be so 
restricted.135 However, this line of argument did not make any headway 
and was jettisoned. 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ was faced with the question of what 
constituted armed attack as a ground for the exercise of the right of self 
defense. In response to the argument of the United States that its use of 
  
 130. The 9/11 attacks on the United States qualified as acts of aggression, which entitled the 
United States to the right of self defense, and it did exercise such right by its military action against 
Afghanistan. The action of the United States was endorsed by the international community. 
 131. See IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 32, 278. 
 132. Such weapons include modern missiles and naval mines. Concerning nuclear weapons, see 
Boisson de Chazounes and Sands (eds.) International Law, the International Court of Justice and 
Nuclear Weapons (1999). On naval mines and modern missiles, see O’Connell, The Influence of 
Law on Sea Power, 70, (1975). On computer warfare, see Schmit, “Computer Network Attack and 
the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework”, 37 Columbia Journal 
of Transnational Law, 885 (1998-1999). 
 133. See Josef Mrazek, Prohibition of the Use and Threat of Force: Self Defense and Self Help 
in International Law, 27 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 81, 109 (1989). 
 134. See Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Definition of Aggression, 1 I.C.L.Q. 137, at 139 (1952). 
 135. See STANIMIR ALEXANDROV, supra note 15, 98. 
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force against Nicaragua was justified as collective self defense of Costa 
Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador in reaction to armed attacks on those 
states by Nicaragua, the ICJ rejected that claim and held that the alleged 
acts committed on those states by Nicaragua did not amount to armed 
attack such as would entitle the United States to use force against 
Nicaragua in exercise of collective self defense. The Court made a 
distinction between the gravest forms of the use of force which constitute 
armed attack, and other forms which are less grave. The court held as 
follows: 
There appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the 
acts, which can be treated as constituting armed attacks. In 
particular, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack 
must be understood as including not merely action by regular 
armed forces across an international border, but also “the 
sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force 
against another state of such gravity as to amount to” (inter alia) 
an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, “or its 
substantial involvement therein”. This description, contained in 
Article 3, paragraph (g) of the Definition of Aggression … may 
be taken to reflect customary international law. The court sees no 
reason to deny that, in customary law, the prohibition of armed 
attacks may apply to the sending by a state of armed bands to the 
territory of another state, if such an operation, because of its 
scale and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack 
rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been carried out by 
regular armed forces. But the court does not believe that the 
concept of “armed attack” includes not only acts by armed bands 
where such acts occur on significant scale but also assistance to 
rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or 
other support. Such assistance may be regarded as a threat or use 
of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external 
affairs of other states…136 
The Court’s view that assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of 
weapons or logistical or other support does not amount to armed attack 
met with much criticism. While Judge Schwebel from the United States, 
in his dissenting opinion, criticized the judgment for having taken a 
narrow definition of armed attack, such as would limit the right of self 
defense and encourage the super powers to overthrow the weaker states, 
  
 136. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103-123, paragraph 195.  
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Judge Jennings from the United Kingdom, in his dissenting view, 
accused the judgment of being unrealistic.137 It may appear there is no 
clear basis for the distinction the court had made above. Does the court’s 
view imply that actions of armed bands and irregular forces, which are of 
minimal scale and effect, do not amount to armed attack? Even with the 
judgment of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, a generally acceptable 
definition of the concept of armed attack still eludes the international 
community. It has been observed that the consequence of the problem of 
the definition of armed attack is that states now assume the freedom to 
determine what meaning is to be given to armed attack in their bid to 
exercise their right of self defense, until the Security Council intervenes, 
in the exercise of its Chapter VII powers, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security, at which point the competence to 
determine what amounts to armed attack reverts to the Security 
Council.138  
F. SELF DEFENSE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 
A new dimension has been added to the concept of self defense with the 
rise in cases of armed attacks by actors who are not states or state agents. 
In the past, there existed attacks from non state actors in the form of 
insurgencies, terrorist attacks and other non-state threats, and 
governments tapped from the resources of international law to respond to 
these occurrences. Such attacks were mainly of small scale compared 
with the present situation. To buttress this position is the Caroline 
incident of 1837,139 which raised legal arguments on forcible action 
across an international boundary with a view to suppressing 
insurrections. At present, attacks by non state actors constitute a top 
ranking issue in discussions of the right to self defense, especially 
terrorist attacks such as those launched on the United States on 
September 11, 2001 (the 9/11 attacks). 
(i) The 9/11 Attacks 
On September 11, the United States territory was attacked. Two 
American commercial airliners crashed into the World Trade Centre 
towers in New York and a third into the Pentagon near Washington, D.C. 
A fourth plane crashed in a small city in Pennsylvania, USA. 
Responsibility for these attacks was attributed to the Al Qaeda terrorist 
organization headed by Osama bin Laden and protected by the Taliban 
  
 137. See Dissenting Opinion, paras. 543-544. 
 138. See STANIMIR ALEXANDROV, supra note 15, 98. 
 139. See MOORE, supra note 89, 412. 
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regime in Afghanistan. On September 14, 2001, the then United States 
president, George W. Bush, announced that: “war has been waged 
against us by stealth and deceit and murder. The nation is peaceful, but 
fierce when stirred to anger. This conflict was begun on the timing and 
terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing.”140 
On the day following the attacks, the United Nations Security Council 
passed Resolution 1368 (September 12, 2001) condemning the acts, 
characterized them “like any act of international terrorism,” as a threat to 
international peace and security, and called for increased international 
co-operation to suppress terrorist acts.141 The Resolution also affirmed 
the right of individual and collective self defense as provided under the 
UN Charter. On its part, NATO invoked Article 5 of its treaty, which 
provides that “an armed attack against one or more of [the parties] in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them 
all…,”142 and therefore declared that all member states should act in 
collective self defense. Following the refusal of the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan to the United States’ demand that the Taliban government 
should surrender Osama bin Laden and other members of Al Qaeda, and 
subject Afghanistan to United States inspection, on October 7, 2001, the 
United States launched a military action in Afghanistan.143 The action 
was called Operation Enduring Freedom, and its purpose was to destroy 
the bases of terrorist activities in Afghanistan and to unseat the Taliban 
government which had provided shelter to Osama bin Laden and his 
cohorts. The United States founded its action on Article 51 of the UN 
Charter and attracted more supporters than critics from the international 
plane.144 Although a state is generally responsible for the acts of its 
organs, which constitute a breach of international law obligation,145 a 
position that arises from the general principle that only states are subjects 
of international law, and that a state, being an abstract concept, can only 
act through its organs or agents; in appropriate cases, a state could be 
internationally responsible where it neglects, fails or refuses to prevent 
its national from committing an act which amounts to an international 
  
 140. See George Walker Bush, President’s Remarks at National Day of Prayer and 
Remembrance (September 14, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2001/09/20010914-2.html. 
 141. See SC Res 1368. 
 142. See Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
 143. See Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 96 
A.J.I.L. 237, at 246 (2002); Byers, “Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 
September 2001”, 51 I.C.L.Q., 401 (2002). 
 144. At the commencement of the operation, the United States received military assistance from 
the United Kingdom, while other states like Canada, Germany, France, and Australia made pledges 
to support it militarily. Iraq disagreed with the legality of the United States action. 
 145. See The 2001 International Law Commission, Articles on State Responsibility, Article 4. 
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derelict.146 The September 11 attacks qualify as armed attacks entitling 
the United States to the exercise of its right to self defense, and its 
military operation in the territory of Afghanistan is justified on the basis 
of the principle of attribution. Some commentators have however argued 
that the position taken by the United States after the terrorist attacks, that 
it would not make any distinction between terrorists and those harboring 
them, and that it would treat any state that harbors terrorists as a hostile 
regime,147 would amount to overstretching the concept of self defense in 
international law, which is not permissible.148 There is ample evidence 
that the Taliban government was inextricably connected to the Al Qaeda 
network and was in fact supporting it.149 This link that existed between 
them satisfied the effective control test.150 The Taliban government 
provided the bases from which Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda 
operated, and the latter were so assimilated into the former to the extent 
it became unclear “which one was controlling the other.”151 No one 
questioned the propriety of the US action, and it would appear that that 
action crystallized an expanded scope of the right of self defense which 
includes the right to proceed against a state which is harboring terrorists, 
even if those terrorists are non-state actors. 
G. PROTECTION OF NATIONALS ABROAD  
The situations that call for an assessment of the legality of an exercise of 
the right to self defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter 
seem to be unending. The invocation of the right of self defense to 
protect nationals of a country in another state is yet one of those 
situations. In the period preceding the emergence of the United Nations 
Charter, there was a popular view allowing the use of force in self 
defense to protect the lives of nationals of a state abroad.152 This was 
predicated upon the belief that the concept of statehood extends to the 
nationals of a state. In other words, a state is an embodiment of its 
  
 146. See ILC Articles on State Responsibility, Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro), 2007  
I.C.J. 191. 
 147. See Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 96 
A.J.I.L., 237 (2002). 
 148. See Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond, 35 
Cornell I.L.J., 532 (2002); Myer and White, The Twin Towers Attack: An Unlimited Right to Self 
Defense, 7 Journal of Conflict and Secutity, 5 (2002). 
 149. On the nexus of the Al Qaeda with the Taliban, see Lawrence Azubuike, Status of Taliban 
and Al Qaeda Soldiers: Another Viewpoint, 19 Conn. J. Int’l. L. 127, at 134-136. 
 150. See the Nicaragua case, supra note 100. 
 151. See Lawrence Azubuike, supra note 149, at 140. 
 152. See Akehurst, The Use of Force to Protect Nationals Abroad” 5 International Relations, 3 
(1977); D’Angelo, Resort to Force to Protect Nationals, 21 Va JIL, 485 (1981), Friedmann, United 
States Policy and the Crisis of International Law, 59 A.J.I.L. 857, 867 (1985). 
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nationals. And so whoever treated badly a national of another state 
offended the state itself since the state owed its nationals the duty of 
protection.153 However with the coming into effect of the UN Charter, the 
acceptability of this view started waning and has been subjected to much 
controversy. Can an armed attack occur against the nationals of a state 
abroad under Article 51 of the UN Charter since it is the state itself that 
must be under attack, not specific persons outside the jurisdiction?154 
Doubts have been expressed on the validity of a claim to the exercise of 
the right of self defense to protect the lives of nationals abroad.155 It 
seems in the majority of the cases where self defense has been advanced 
by states to protect their nationals abroad, the Security Council or the 
General Assembly has disapproved of such conduct. In the Suez Canal 
incident of 1956, an aspect of the United Kingdom’s claim that its 
intervention in Egypt was necessary in order for it to protect its nationals 
abroad was discountenanced by the General Assembly. But since this 
justification put up by the United Kingdom was just one of the many 
reasons the UK adduced, coupled with the fact that that justification did 
not seem to have any foundation in fact, its rejection by the General 
Assembly cannot be taken as conclusive of its validity in law.156 
In the popular Entebbe raid of 1976, an Air France airliner was hijacked 
and some Israeli nationals were taken and held hostage by Palestinian 
and other terrorists at Entebbe, Uganda. Israel used force to free its 
nationals and invoked the provision of Article 51, arguing that it had the 
right to use force to protect its nationals on the basis of self defense. It 
therefore contended that its action was within the limits imposed by the 
Caroline incident. While Israel received tacit support from the United 
States, a majority of the members of the Security Council did not agree 
with the argument of Israel, and some states pointed out that self defense 
could only be used when the state itself is the victim of an armed 
attack.157 The right of self defense to protect nationals was among the 
  
 153. See Vattel, supra note 21, note 1.29, Book II, Chapter VI, para. 71; Classics, supra, 136. 
 154. See MALCOLM SHAW, supra note 10, 696. 
 155. Ian Brownlie has noted as follows: “… it is considered that it is very doubtful if the present 
form of intervention has any basis in the modern law. The instances in which states have purported 
to exercise it, and the terms in which it is delimited, show that it provides infinite opportunities for 
abuse. Forcible intervention is now unlawful. It is true that the protection of nationals presents 
particular difficulties and that a government faced with a deliberate massacre of a considerable 
number of nationals in a foreign state would have cogent reasons of humanity for acting, and would 
also be under very great political pressure. The possible risks of denying the legality of action in a 
case of such urgency, an exceptional circumstance, must be weighed against the more calculable 
dangers of providing legal pretexts for the commission of breaches of the peace in the pursuit of 
national rather than humanitarian interests” See Ian Brownlie, supra, 301. 
 156. See IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 32, 297. 
 157. Romania, S/PV.1942, at 22; India, S/PV. 1942, at 62; Cuba, S/PV. 1943, at 47. 
32
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 17 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol17/iss1/8
2011] PROBING THE SCOPE OF SELF DEFENSE 161 
grounds raised by the United States to justify its invasions of Grenada158 
in 1983 and Panama159 in 1989. The Grenada invasion was condemned 
by the General Assembly, which described it as a flagrant violation of 
international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Grenada.160 An effort to obtain the Security Council’s 
condemnation of the invasion was vetoed by the United States.161 In the 
Panama case, a Security Council resolution denouncing the action of the 
United States could not be adopted due to the veto by France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. But the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution condemning the invasion and called for the immediate 
cessation of the intervention and the withdrawal of the United States 
from Panama.162 
A central issue in the disposition of the question of the legality of the use 
of self defense to protect the nationals of a state abroad is the recurring 
question of whether or not such right is covered by Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, or as many writers have contended that Article 51 preserves the 
customary law right of self defense, whether such customary law 
recognized the use of self defense for the protection of nationals abroad. 
The argument that self defense as it existed before the drafting of the UN 
Charter extended to the right of intervention for the protection of 
nationals abroad ignores the fact that the then existing customary law 
seemed to have equated self defense with self preservation and self 
protection. Assuming that was the case, it is doubtful if such position can 
continue under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It has been suggested by 
Waldock that the exercise of the right of self defense to protect nationals 
is justified under certain conditions, namely: (a) an imminent threat of 
injury to the nationals; (b) a failure or inability on the part of the 
territorial sovereign to protect them; and (c) measures of protection 
strictly confined to the object of protecting them against injury.163 These 
conditions would only apply if such right is recognized under Article 51, 
but state practice is short of reflecting such a right.164 Furthermore, self-
defense is invoked when there is an armed attack on a state. An argument 
that an attack on a state’s nationals abroad constitutes an attack on that 
  
 158. See Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada, 78 A.J.I.L. 131 (1984). 
 159. See Use of Force, Protection of Nationals – Deployment of U.S. Forces to Panama (U.S. 
Digest, Chap. 14, S.1), reprinted in 84 A.J.I.L. 545 (1990). 
 160. See GA Res. 38/7 (108-9-27). 
 161. See 1983 UNYB 211. 
 162. See GA Res. 44/240 (75-20-40) (Dec. 29, 1989). 
 163. See Waldock, supra note 96, 467. These conditions are similar to the conditions recognized 
in the Caroline incident. 
 164. See RONZITTI, RESCUING NATIONAL ABROAD THROUGH MILITARY 
COERCION AND INTERVENTION ON THE GROUNDS OF HUMANITY, 52-76 (Dordrecht, 
1985); IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 32, 299; Akehurst, supra note 152, 104. 
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state itself of which the nationals are citizens is a mere pretext.165 The 
concept of nationality, the basis upon which the justification for this 
aspect of self defense is sought is not even without controversy under 
international law.166 Is nationality equated with citizenship? Where one is 
a citizen of say, two states, and resides in one of the two states, can the 
other state of which he is also a citizen exercise the right of self defense 
against the first state in order to protect him from a mistreatment meted 
to him by the state where he is residing? Where the nationals of a state 
are being mistreated by another state, the best way towards resolving the 
problem and thereby safeguarding them has been by diplomacy. While in 
extreme cases of maltreatment, for instance the wanton massacre of 
considerable number of nationals, a state may possess an intrinsic right to 
protect its nationals; such right can be located elsewhere, say, under the 
principle of sovereignty, but certainly not under the concept of self 
defense pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
H. CONDITIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE 
(i) Necessity and Proportionality 
The conditions of necessity and proportionality are the core factors taken 
into consideration in the determination of the lawfulness or genuineness 
of a state’s claim to the exercise of the right of self defense. The 
requirements of necessity and proportionality are derived from 
customary international law that existed before 1945 and are often traced 
to the Caroline incident of 1837. They have, however, survived the 
adoption of the UN Charter.167 These principles stipulate that a state 
which is the victim of an armed attack is entitled to use force against the 
attacker, but only to the extent necessary to defend itself and repel the 
attack and no more. Necessity presupposes the existence of an ongoing 
armed attack and the need to stop the attack. The necessity principle 
requires that, to justify an action in self defense, a state must show that 
the action it has taken was the only option at its disposal in the 
circumstances of the armed attack against it by the attacker, and that 
there was no other means it could have used to ward off the attack.168 
Proportionality inquires into the overall scale and effect of the means 
employed to repel the armed attack and its relationship to the attack 
  
 165. See RONZITTI, supra note 164, 69. 
 166. See the Nottebohm case, I.C.J. Reports, 1955, 5. 
 167. See the Nicaragua case, supra note 100; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
I.C.J. Reports (1996) 226, para. 141. 
 168. See Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
2004 I.C.J. 136, 195, para. 140. 
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itself.169 Thus, a kind of comparison is drawn between the gravity of the 
armed attack and the seriousness of the force used to defend it. To legally 
exercise the right of self defense, a state should not exceed the degree 
and kind of force required to repel the armed attack against it or to 
restore its security. The requirements of necessity and proportionality are 
founded on the position that the aim of self defense is to put an end to the 
illegal situation arising from the armed attack and nothing more. Thus, 
self defense should not be retaliatory or punitive.170 
It is important to note that necessity and proportionality as conditions for 
the exercise of the right of self defense do not necessarily stipulate that a 
state which is a victim of an armed attack must use only the same degree 
and kind of force, or even the same weapons as the attacking state, but 
that the state, to properly act in self defense, use such force as is 
proportionate to what is required to achieve the legitimate objectives of 
self defense. Notwithstanding this last point, an important factor used in 
a consideration of the necessity of self defense is the nature of the 
weapon used.171 In determining the legality of an exercise of the right of 
self defense in terms of the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality, once the first condition is met, the court or tribunal goes 
into the second test, and if that condition is equally met, then that self 
defense claim is justified. Thus, an action in self defense can satisfy the 
necessity test, but fail to meet the proportionality requirement. In that 
case, a claim to self defense would not be justified. But where the 
necessity requirement is not met, it would be needless to go into the 
proportionality test as that requirement would invariably crumble.172 
There are no hard and fast rules governing the determination of the 
necessity or proportionality of self defense. It all depends on the facts of 
a particular case. In the Nicaragua case, although the I.C.J. had, on other 
grounds, found the actions of the United States as not amounting to a 
legitimate exercise of the right to self defense, the court ruled that the 
United States attacks on Nicaragua, assuming those acts were properly 
founded on the exercise of the right of self defense, were not necessary, 
neither were they proportionate to the alleged assistance the Nicaraguan 
government rendered to El Salvador.173   
  
 169. See Gill T.D., supra note 99, 366. 
 170. See CHRISTINE GRAY, supra note 80, 121. 
 171. See Leo Van den hole, supra note 87, 101. 
 172. See the Oil Platform Case (Iran v. United States), 2003 I.C.J. 161, para. 76-77. 
 173. See the Nicaragua case, supra note 100, para. 237. In the Oil Platform Case (Iran v. United 
States), the I.C.J. reached similar conclusion when it held that there was no necessity justifying the 
United States attacks on the platforms, since there was nothing to show that the United States had 
complained to Iran of the military activities of the platforms. 
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The requirements of necessity and proportionality continue to be the 
major guideline in the determination of the legality of a claim to the right 
of self defense. Each state involved in a dispute where self defense is 
raised puts forward the argument that is favorable to it. But it is the court, 
after a consideration of the facts of the case that would make a decision 
one way or the other.  
IV. ANTICIPATORY SELF DEFENSE 
A. BACKGROUND 
Anticipatory self defense is simply the exercise by a state of the right of 
self defense towards an armed attack that is yet to be unleashed on that 
state by another state. As the name suggests, it is the use of self defense 
to ward off an attack, the commission of which has not been initiated. 
The principle of anticipatory self defense is one of the many aspects of 
the general concept of self defense that have generated the most 
sustained controversy. The controversy is aptly represented by two 
schools of thought. While the proponents of the first school argue for a 
narrow, limited interpretation of the exercise of the right of self defense 
to apply to only situations of “armed attack”, those espousing the second 
view see self defense as extending beyond the exercise of it in cases of 
armed attack, but also applying in the event of possible attack. Such is 
the academic debate. 
B. THE RESTRICTIVE SCHOOL  
The gravamen of the argument of this school is that the right of self 
defense can only be exercised by a state which has been a victim of an 
actual armed attack. This argument, built on a textual interpretation of 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, posits that there is nothing in Article 51 
that indicates that the right of self defense should be exercised in any 
other event outside the occurrence of an armed attack.174 This view 
suggests there is much clarity in the provision of Article 51 and 
therefore, unnecessary meaning should not be introduced in its 
interpretation. The text of that provision calls for its narrow 
interpretation. The limitation imposed on the right of self defense under 
Article 51, namely, that it be exercised only in cases of an armed attack 
will be defeated by a liberal interpretation of Article 51. It would seem 
that those who favor a restrictive interpretation of self defense under 
Article 51 believe that at the time the UN Charter became operational, 
  
 174. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF DEFENSE, 167, 3rd ed. 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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customary international law did not permit an unrestricted right of self-
defense.175 To buttress the argument that Article 51 does not allow self 
defense in anticipation of an attack, it is posited that Article 51 confines 
the duty of the Security Council to only the employment of counter force 
in response to an armed attack. The argument of supporters of the 
restrictive school is built on a strong policy consideration and is a 
reaction to the view held by the expansive school. The proponents of the 
expansive school have argued that an insistence that a state must in all 
cases wait until it is attacked before it could exercise its right of self 
defense, may have adverse consequences on that state, especially 
considering the nature of modern weapons.176 Advocates of the restrictive 
school maintain that anticipatory self defense involves the task of 
ascertaining the existence of an imminent armed attack. Determining 
with certainty that an armed attack is imminent is extremely difficult, and 
a wrong judgment may lead to an unwarranted and unnecessary conflict 
between states.177 Although in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the 
United States did not invoke anticipatory self defense as a justification of 
its action, but had advanced Article 52 of the UN Charter and provisions 
of the Rio Treaty, which deal with threats to the peace other than armed 
attack,178 some academic views sought to justify United States action on 
that basis.179 Other writers expressed an opposing view.180 There was 
even from some quarters the view that the United States could not invoke 
the right of self defense since it could not prove any necessity warranting 
the exercise of such right and since there was no proof of the offensive 
character of military developments in Cuba.181 It was argued, and rightly 
too, that Cuba was only exercising its right of self defense by the 
installation of the missiles as it had previously been attacked by the 
United States.182 It could be inferred that the avoidance of a claim to the 
right of anticipatory self defense on the part of the United States suggests 
  
 175. See IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 32, 259; RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: 
A STUDY OF THE LEGAL CONCEPT (1979). 
 176. See Myres McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self Defense, 57 A.J.I.L. 597 
(1963); Gardener, Commentary on the Law of Self Defense, in Law and Force in the New 
International Order 51- 52 ( Damrosch & Scheffer eds.) (1991). 
 177. See IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 32, 259. 
 178. See the letter of the United States to the Security Council of  Oct. 22, 1962, UN Doc. 
S/5181, 17 SCOR, Suppl. for Oct.-Dec., 1962, at 146-148; Resolution of the Council for the 
Organization of American States of October 23, 1962, 47 Department of State Bulletin 722-723 
(1962). 
 179. See MacChesney, Some Comments on the ‘Quarantine’ of Cuba, 57 A.J.I.L. 592 (1963). 
 180. See HENKINS, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, 295- 296, 2nd ed. (1979). 
 181. See the Statement of Mr. Quaison-Sackey (Ghana), UN Doc. S/PV. 124 (1962), at 51. 
 182. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, supra note 111, 203. 
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the uncertainty of the legality of that right under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.183 
In 1981, Israel bombed a nuclear reactor that was still under construction 
in Iraq and expressly sought justification for its action under the right of 
anticipatory self defense on the basis of Article 51. Israel argued for an 
expansive interpretation of self defense that would apply to forestall an 
imminent attack.184 Iraq, however, maintained a contrary position, 
contending that the right of self defense only applied to cases of armed 
attack. Israel’s argument did not prevail in the Security Council, which in 
its unanimous resolution, roundly condemned the military attack by 
Israel as a clear violation of the UN Charter.185 The contention of Israel 
was that the nuclear reactor in Iraq was a threat to it, and therefore it 
would be dangerous for Israel to wait longer when the construction of the 
nuclear reactor would have been completed before acting in self defense. 
It could be suggested from this argument that Israel was not under any 
imminent threat from Iraq so self defense did not apply. 
C. THE EXPANSIVE THEORY 
In contrast to the view of the advocates of the restrictive school, the 
expansive school of thought maintains that the right of self defense under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter is wide enough to cover the use of self 
defense against an anticipated armed attack. Those who hold this view 
readily make reference to the term, “inherent right of self defense,” used 
in Article 51, as a suggestion that the UN Charter preserves the 
customary international law right of self defense that was in existence 
prior to the UN Chapter. This customary law permitted anticipatory self 
defense.186 The plank upon which the principle of anticipatory self 
defense is built is that it cannot be right to expect a state to be a “sitting 
duck and wait until the bombs are actually dropping on its soil” before it 
could act in self-defense.187 Besides, “the fear that nuclear missiles could, 
on the first strike, destroy the capability for defense and allow virtually 
no time for defense has appeared too many to render a requirement of 
armed attack unreasonable”.188 Thus, it would amount to “a travesty of 
the purposes of the Charter to compel a defending state to allow its 
  
 183. See Goodrich Hambro and Simmons, supra note 69, 345. 
 184. See Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1981-1984, 202-204. 
 185. See SC Res. 487 (June 19, 1981); UN Doc. S/RES/487 (1981). 
 186. See Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self Defense in Modern International Law, 
136 RCADI (1972-II), 463 Bowett, supra note 54; McDOUGAL and FELICIANO, LAW AND 
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961). 
 187. See Gardner, supra note 176, 51-52; Myres McDougal, supra note 176, 597. 
 188. See Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1620, 1633- 
1635 (1984). 
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assailant to deliver the first, and perhaps fatal, blow”.189 Another 
argument proffered to support anticipatory self defense is the ineffective 
nature of the UN collective security system, especially in the era of the 
Cold War.190 With the precarious situation, a measure of self defense 
against an imminent threat became necessary. States therefore inherited 
from the United Nations the responsibility to act swiftly to maintain 
international peace and security.191 It is also argued in favor of 
anticipatory self defense that in a situation of an imminent armed attack 
on a state, where there is no time on the part of that state to take any 
action to prevent the attack, it becomes necessary for that state to take 
anticipatory action against the attack, and the right to use this preemptive 
action is not denied by Article 51, especially when it is construed 
together with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.192 
The adherents of the expansive school find succor in the Caroline 
incident which they allege to have established the right of anticipatory 
self defense.193 They maintain that the words of the Secretary of State 
Daniel Webster that an intrusion into the territory of another state can be 
justified as an act of self defense only in those “cases in which the 
necessity of that self defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no 
choice of means and no moment for deliberation”194 set forth a limited 
right of preventive action because they did not require an actual armed 
attack.195 
In the absence of any dispositive statement determining the legality or 
otherwise of the exercise of anticipatory self defense, the debate rages 
on. The International Court of Justice has not even helped matters. 
Despite the numerous cases it has decided and the advisory opinions it 
has rendered involving the use of force, including the right of self-
defense,196 it has not clarified whether or not anticipatory self defense is 
  
 189. See Guy Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self Help Paradigm: A Legal Regime for 
Enforcing the Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy 483, 513 (1999). 
 190. See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jennings in the Nicaragua case, supra note 100, at 
543- 544. 
 191. See FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 259- 
260 (1964). 
 192. See HENKIN, supra note 180, 143- 145. 
 193. See Gill T.D., supra note 99, 364-365, Leo Van den hole, supra, 95. 
 194. See Letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton of August 6, 1842, 
cited in Moore, John Bassett, A Digest of International Law, Vol. II, 412 (1906). 
 195. See Leo Van den hole, supra note 87, 96-97. 
 196. For example: the Oil Platforms Case (Iran v. United States) 2003 I.C.J. 161; Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J.; 
Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J., 136, 195. 
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permissible. In the Nicaragua case, which circumstances compelled the 
court to decide under customary international law, the I.C.J. only ruled 
that the UN Charter’s provision on the use of force corresponds 
essentially to customary international law. However, the court did not 
make any pronouncement on anticipatory self defense because it felt it 
was not necessary to adjudicate on that issue. 
It seems that the weapons used by the proponents of a restrictive right of 
self defense, on the one hand, and those arguing for a liberal 
interpretation of the right of self defense, on the other hand, are the 
terms, “armed attack” and “inherent right of individual or collective self 
defense”, respectively. A determination of whether the term armed attack 
as used in Article 51 of the UN Charter as a basis for the exercise of the 
right of self defense includes an imminent attack does not pose much 
problem. The task in this regard is to ascertain if “armed attack” contains 
any ambiguity in its meaning, which does not appear so. That term 
implies an actual attack that has taken place or is taking place, and not a 
future attack or an imminent attack, or even a threatened attack. 
Secondly, can the drafters of the UN Charter be considered as law 
makers, that is, legislators? Or put in another way, are their roles to be 
seen as similar to those of law makers? The answer to this question, no 
doubt, should be in the affirmative. It is a cardinal principle of law that 
the legislature does not use words in vain. Therefore, the term, “armed 
attack” appearing in Article 51 is not cosmetic; neither did the drafters of 
the UN Charter use it in vain. If they had intended the right of self 
defense under the UN Charter to extend to self defense in anticipation of 
armed attack, they would have expressly done so. The best way to 
ascertain the intention of the legislature when interpreting legislation is 
to look at the actual words used in a particular piece of legislation. It is 
only when there is ambiguity in a provision of that piece of legislation 
that recourse is had to some other interpretation aid. Thus the assertion, 
made in support of anticipatory self defense, that the negotiating history 
of the drafting of the UN Charter or its travaux preparatoires 
incorporates the entire gamut of customary law rules on self defense,197 
cannot prevail over the clear provisions of Article 51. The term, “armed 
attack” as used in Article 51, contains no ambiguity. It presupposes that 
the right of self defense is exercisable by a state only when that state is a 
victim of an actual armed attack and not when there is an imaginary 
attack or a fanciful attack on that state. Stretching that term to include 
anticipated or imminent armed attack would defy every cannon of 
legislative interpretation. 
  
 197. See Thomas Plofchan, Article 51: Limits on Self Defense? 13 Mich. J. Int’l L. 336, 343- 
350 (1992). 
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On the other hand, to determine whether Article 51 of the UN Charter 
gives recognition to anticipatory self defense when it makes reference to 
“inherent right of individual or collective self defense”, an expression 
that has consistently been interpreted to mean customary international 
law recognition of self defense, is to determine if anticipatory self 
defense existed under customary international law when the Charter of 
the United Nations came into existence. This task becomes meaningful in 
the light of the near unanimous view that Article 51 is a codification of 
the customary international law that was already in practice prior to 
inception of the UN Charter regime. If this wide view is correct, it then 
follows that Article 51 could not have codified what was not in existence 
at the time the UN Charter came into force. Reference is always made to 
the Caroline incident to show that anticipatory self defense existed under 
customary international law before 1945 and still exists by virtue of 
Article 51. Did the Caroline incident clearly endorse the exercise of the 
right of self defense against a threatened attack on a state, as is 
proclaimed by some writers? The verbal formula in the Caroline incident 
was issued out when self defense was equated with self preservation.198 
That formulation by Daniel Webster does not reflect state practice. 
Besides, the application of the requirements, enunciated therein, are not 
compatible with situations where an armed attack has not occurred. 
There are certain difficulties inherent in the notion of anticipatory self 
defense. A state has to determine with some exactitude that another state 
has perfected plans to launch an armed attack on it. This determination is 
not easy to make, and a wrong assessment of the situation may turn the 
state into an author of aggression, in its bid to defend itself from an 
armed attack existing only in the figment of its imagination. An attempt 
to get around these problems has led to another categorization, or rather, 
distinction. This is tendency to distinguish “anticipatory self defense, 
where an armed attack is foreseeable, from interceptive self defense 
where an armed attack is imminent and unavoidable”, such that the 
exercise of self defense is permitted in the latter, but not in the former.199 
The content of the right of self defense under Article 51 is not altogether 
the same with self defense under customary international law. Reference 
is readily made to the view of the International Court of Justice in the 
Nicaragua case that the principles of the use of force under the Charter 
coincide with those under customary international law. The same court, 
however, did cite one difference that exists between self defense under 
Article 51 and under customary international law, when it remarked that: 
“the court, whose decision has to be made on the basis of customary 
international law, has already observed that in context of the law, the 
  
 198. IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 32, 258. 
 199. See MALCOLM SHAW, supra note 3, third ed., 695. 
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reporting obligation enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations does not exist.”  
D. SELF DEFENSE AND THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION 
While the battle over the legitimacy of anticipatory self defense is being 
fiercely fought, international law is confronted with yet another combat, 
somehow related to the anticipatory self defense debate. This new battle 
is the one over the preemption doctrine or preemptive self-defense.200 The 
distinction between anticipatory self defense and the preemptive doctrine 
seems to be that while anticipatory self defense consists in the exercise of 
the right of self defense against an individual armed attack that is 
imminent, preemptive self defense involves the use of force in self 
defense against a whole series of attacks, which have accumulated over 
time, in order to repel future attacks that may come from the attacker.201 
The most contemporary, and perhaps controversial, issues of preemptive 
self defense are found in the National Security Strategy document 
published by the government of the United States in 2002, during the 
administration of President George W. Bush. The publication was in 
response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States, and was aimed at 
fighting terrorism and states harboring terrorists. The policy espoused by 
this document is sometimes referred to as the “Bush Doctrine”.202 The 
central theme of that policy is contained in its message that:  
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities 
and objectives of today’s adversaries… The United States has 
long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a 
sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, 
the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the 
case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if 
uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s 
attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our 
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act 
preemptively.203 
It is manifest from the United States’ publication that preemptive self 
defense permits the use of force in self defense against an armed attack 
that has ceased to exist. In other words, it entitles the state invoking it to 
act in self defense when there is no necessity for so acting. It would 
  
 200. “Preemption doctrine” (or the doctrine of preemption) and “preemptive self defense” are 
used interchangeably here. 
 201. See STANIMIR ALEXANDROV, supra note 15, 166. 
 202. See LORI DAMROSCH, et al,  supra note 77, 1187. 
 203. See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 15 (Sept. 2002). 
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appear that this would no longer be self defense, but reprisal, because as 
has been stated, “For the use of force to be permissible under the 
Charter, such force must . . . be immediately subsequent to and 
proportional to the armed attack to which it is an answer. If excessively 
delayed or excessively severe, it ceased to be self defense and became a 
reprisal … an action inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations.204 Reprisal attacks, unlike acts of self defense which are 
defensive, are punitive in character.205 Thus, the preemptive doctrine has 
no legal basis under international law. It is on this basis that the United 
States’ bombing of Iraq in 1993 has been criticized. The United States 
had fired twenty three tomahawk missiles on Iraqi military outposts,206 
allegedly in response to an Iraqi plot, supported by the then President of 
Iraq, Saddam Hussein, to assassinate former President George H. Bush 
while he was on a visit to Kuwait. Based on an investigation carried out 
by the Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Central 
Intelligence Agency,207 which resulted in a report containing 
circumstantial evidence, the Clinton administration believed that the 
assassination plot in fact existed and sought justification for the bombing 
under the right of self defense in Article 51 of the UN Charter.208 Those 
who hailed the action of the United States in bombing Iraq as being 
permitted under self defense have proffered some arguments, the validity 
of which is doubtful. They opine that, considering the strained 
international relations between the United States and Iraq at that time, the 
bombing was justified.209 They also claim that judging from Iraq’s 
antecedents on the international plane (its conduct in the Gulf War and 
its interference with United Nations inspectors) future assassination plots 
by Iraq were feasible.210 These arguments are anything but persuasive. 
There are strong points to show that the United States’ missile attack on 
Iraq has no justification in international law. First, assuming the 
assassination plot on the President of the United States was real, since 
the plot was discovered and therefore foiled before its execution, could it 
be said there was an armed attack on the United States or even a threat of 
attack?211 The answer is clearly in the negative. Again, still based on the 
  
 204. See GA, 20th Session, Sixth Committee, 886th mtg.  (Dec. 1, 1965). 
 205. See Report of the International Law Commission, 32nd Session, 1980 II (2) Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 1, 53- 54. 
 206. See Ryan Hendrickson, Article 51 and the Clinton Presidency: Military Strikes and the UN 
Charter, 19 B.U. Int’l. L. J. 207 (2001). 
 207. See Alan Surchin, Terror and Law: The Unilateral Use of Force and the June 1993 
Bombing of Baghdad, 5 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 457, 459-461 (1995). 
 208. See Ryan Hendrickson, supra note 206, 213. 
 209. See Lieutenant Commander Winthrop, Attack on the Iraqi Intelligence Service 
Headquarters, 1993 Army Law 45 (1993). 
 210. Alan Surchin, supra, note 207, 474. 
 211. See Ryan Hendrickson, supra, note 206, 214. 
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assumption above, the bombing was not necessary considering the time 
the assassination plot was uncovered and the time the attack took place 
(two-month interval).212 The attack also was not proportionate to the 
alleged threat. It was therefore a reprisal rather than a defense. There was 
ample time for the United States to take other measures, like negotiation 
or making a report to the Security Council, and perhaps seeking its 
authorization to respond to the assassination plot.213 
The National Security Strategy of the United States, which is targeted at 
terrorism, has many flaws. As can be seen, one of the objectives of the 
Bush Doctrine is to deter and prevent terrorists who have the potentials 
to attack in the future, and this deterrence would involve the use of force 
on those states the United States perceive to be involved in terrorist 
activities, including the harboring of terrorists. What threshold would be 
used to measure what would be necessary and proportionate to prevent a 
future attack, which likelihood of occurrence is more of a guess work 
than a scientific determination? Much as the majority of the international 
community lent their support to the United States in its military 
operations in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks, the circumstances 
of which were quite ascertainable and justifiable, an extension of the war 
on terrorism to states that are not directly connected214 to the terrorist 
attacks on the United States215 would need extra-ordinary argument to fit 
into the requirements of international law.216 It was based on the Bush 
Doctrine that Iraq, Iran and North Korea were identified by the United 
States as the “Axis of Evil”, and the war on terrorism extended to them. 
While not making any argument regarding the legality of the acquisition 
of weapons of mass destruction by states, a hazy area the International 
Court of Justice has not been able to clear,217 the possession of, or 
capacity to possess, weapons of mass destruction by a state does not lead 
  
 212. The alleged assassination plot was discovered in April 1993 while the bombing took place 
in June 1993. See Alan Surchin, supra note 207, 474-475. 
 213. See STANIMIR ALEXANDROV, supra note 15, 187..  
 214. The United States and the United Kingdom could not substantially link Saddam Hussein 
with the 9/11 attacks. See UK Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 200-02, 
Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism, HC 384, para. 215. 
 215. In its letter to the Security Council under Article 51 of the UN Charter following the 9/11 
attacks, the United States had remarked: “… our inquiry is still in its early stages. We may find that 
our self defense requires further actions with respect to other organizations and other states”. See 
S/2001/946. 
 216. For the controversy surrounding this extension of the fight against terrorism, see Glennon, 
The Fog of Law: Self Defense, Inherence and Incoherence in Article 51 of the UN Charter, 25 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 539 (2002); Bothe, Terrorism and the Legality of 
Preemptive Force”, 14 E.J.I.L., 227 (2002); Sofaer, “On the Need of Preemption, 14 E.J.I.L., 209 
(2003). 
 217. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapon Weapons, International Court of 
Justice, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, para.48. 
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to the conclusion that such possession or capacity thereof is for terrorist 
purposes. 
The preemption doctrine was invoked again by the United States to 
attack Iraq in March in 2003, with the military support of the United 
Kingdom and Australia under Operation Iraqi Freedom, in the absence of 
an express authorization from the United Nations Security Council.218 
The purpose of the Operation was to purge Iraq of its weapons of mass 
destruction. Like the 1993 missile attacks on Iraq, the legality of this 
joint venture has been an issue of controversy among scholars and 
commentators,219especially considering the fact that after Saddam 
Hussein was forced out of power in Iraq in April 2003, the United States 
and the United Kingdom did not discover any weapons of mass 
destruction in the possession of Iraq.220 International law, at least in 
principle, presumes the equality of states. The danger of the preemptive 
doctrine is that if it is claimed by one state, other states would equally 
seek to invoke it.221 Terrorism is a dastardly act that is both detested and 
reprehensible in international law. No well meaning state can condone 
acts of terrorism. The efforts at fighting terrorism should be concerted 
and coordinated. However, international law is an embodiment of rules 
regulating the relations of states. The United Nations Charter is the most 
important document regulating international relations, supplemented or 
rather complemented, by rules of customary international law. Whatever 
conduct that is undertaken by a state, either individually or with another 
state, should conform to both the UN Charter and customary 
international law. The preemptive use of force does not seem to have 
support under both regimes.  
V. COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Both customary international law and the UN Charter recognize the right 
of collective self defense. Article 51, in addition to its provision for 
individual self defense, entitles a state to the right of collective self 
defense if an armed attack occurs. A preliminary issue that may be raised 
here is whether a non-member of the United Nations is entitled to the 
  
 218. See CHRISTINE GRAY, supra note 80, 270. 
 219. See Agora: Future Implications of the Iraqi Conflict, 97 A.J.I.L. 253 (2003); Kessings 
(2003), 45453, 45508, 45520, 45588; CHRISTINE GRAY, supra note 80,193- 194. 
 220. UMOZURIKE has observed that “thorough searches after the invasion of Iraq showed 
there were no weapons of mass destruction nor were the links with terrorist groups established”. See 
UMOZURIKE, supra note 63, 207; See also CHRISTINE GRAY, supra note 80, 183. 
 221. See LORI DAMROSCH, et al, supra note 77, 1187. 
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right of collective self defense. In other words, can members of the 
United Nations act in collective self defense in favor of a non-member? 
State practice shows that the answer is in the affirmative.222 The right of 
self defense, whether individual or collective, is inherent in all states, and 
a state should not be denied the right on account of its non membership 
of the United Nations.  Another point is that collective self defense is not 
merely the aggregate of individual right of self defense, since practice 
has shown that a third state may exercise the right of collective self 
defense even where it has no interest of its own to protect, provided that 
the victim state has suffered an armed attack.223 Collective self defense 
could be by a third state, or in the form of regional organizations or 
arrangements.224 
B. COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENSE BY A THIRD STATE 
A state may act in collective self defense in aid to a victim state, whether 
or not there is a treaty obligation between it and that other state, provided 
there has been an armed attack on the state being defended, and it has 
requested the assistance of the first state. In addition, the victim state 
should have declared itself to have been attacked.225 Hence, it has been 
observed that during the San Francisco Conference, Article 51 was 
intentionally transferred from Chapter VIII to Chapter VII “with the 
result that the right of collective self defense is entirely independent of 
the existence of a regional arrangement”.226 The views expressed at some 
point in the past that the right of collective self defense could avail a 
third state only if there was an existing agreement for collective defense 
between it and the victim state,227 and that a common interest must exist 
between the two states228 are positions incompatible with Article 51 
which recognizes self defense as a right and not a duty, although it could 
metamorphose into a duty by regional arrangements or collective self 
defense pacts.229 However, in a majority of the cases, there is a treaty 
relationship or arrangement between the third state and the state being 
defended.230 
  
 222. See IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 32, 280, 329. 
 223. This is inferable from the judgment of the I.C.J. in the Nicaragua case. See para 211. 
 224. It may also be by a group of states with an express approval of the United Nations. See 
STANIMIR ALEXANDROV, supra note 15, 252- 278. 
 225. See the Nicaragua case, supra note 100, paras. 195, 199, 232. 
 226. See Wadlock, supra note 96, 504. 
 227. See Kulski, The Soviet System of Collective Security Compared with the Western System, 
(44) A.J.I.L. 453 (1950). 
 228. See McDOUGAL and FELICIANO, supra note 92; BOWETT, supra note 54. 
 229. See STANIMIR ALEXANDROV, supra note 15, 109, 102. 
 230. See Humphrey Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in 
International Law, 81 Hague Recueil 455 (1952-II). 
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Like the right of individual self defense, collective self defense has been 
subjected to abuse by states. In some instances, a state may claim a right 
of collective self defense when there has been no armed attack. In 
Lebanon in 1958, a struggle for power had occurred within the Lebanese 
government, which led to the infiltration, into Lebanese territory, of 
armed men and arms supply from Syria in the United Arab Republic, but 
there was no attack on the territory of Lebanon. Lebanon felt there had 
been interference in its internal affairs by the United Arab Republic.231 
On the request of Lebanon, the United States sent its troops to Lebanon 
and claimed the purpose was to help Lebanon stabilize the political 
situation created by the interference of the United Arab Republic, 
pending when the United Nations would take necessary measures in 
respect of the situation.232 The United States and Lebanon relied on 
collective self defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Although 
states were divided in their opinion as to the legality of the intervention 
of the United States,233 there was no clear basis for the exercise of the 
right of collective self defense by the United States in the absence of an 
armed attack. The failure of the United States to cite any incident of 
armed attack on Lebanon by the United Arab Republic strengthens this 
conclusion. 
The General Assembly frowned at a similar effort, by the Soviet Union, 
to place reliance on Article 51 of the UN Charter, in December 1979, to 
justify its intervention in Afghanistan. This was after an attempt by the 
Security Council to pass a resolution condemning the action of the Soviet 
Union was defeated by the veto of the Soviet Union.234  
C. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/ARRANGEMENTS 
Although it has been stated that collective self defense generally does not 
depend on the existence of a treaty or other form of agreement, states do 
enter into treaties on collective self defense, where they create a duty on 
all members to assist one another in the face of an armed attack against a 
member. The treaties so made create a duty of self defense, 
supplemented by the right of self defense under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, to the extent that an attack on a member is seen as an attack on 
all the members entitling them to collective self-defense.235 One 
  
 231. Lebanon made other allegations against the United Arab Republic, including acts of 
terrorism. See the letter of Lebanon of May 22, 1958 to the Security Council, UN Doc. S/4007, 13 
SCOR, Suppl. April-June 1958, at 33. 
 232. See 13 SCOR, 827th meeting, 15 July, 1958. 
 233. See CHRISTINE GRAY, supra note 80, 144. 
 234. See STANIMIR ALEXANDROV, supra note 15, 226-227. 
 235. See Mrazek, Prohibition of the Use and Threat of Force: Self Defense and Self Help in 
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clarification must be made here. Article 51, which provides for collective 
self defense, is not part of Chapter III of the UN Charter- the provision 
on regional arrangements. Regional arrangements are indirect 
instruments utilized by the Security Council to maintain international 
peace and security, and any action taken under the regional arrangements 
must be with the authorization of the Security Council.236 On the other 
hand, the exercise of the right of collective self defense under Article 51 
does not require the prior consent of the Security Council. Despite the 
foregoing distinction, a self defense treaty can have the dual character of 
a self defense pact and a regional arrangement.237 However, the danger 
inherent in this dual character of a treaty is that a regional arrangement or 
organization may, under the guise of exercising the right of collective 
self defense pursuant to Article 51 take enforcement action under 
Chapter III of the UN Charter without obtaining the consent of the 
Security Council.238 
There have been less cases of collective self defense founded on treaties 
when compared with the number of collective self-defense treaties,239 and 
those instances were mired in controversy. In August 1968, 
Czechoslovakia was visited with an illegal use of force by a regional 
organization, comprising members of the Warsaw Pact under the guise of 
collective self defense. Part of the justification claimed by the Soviet 
Union was that the intervention was on the request of the government of 
Czechoslovakia. This defense was rejected by the majority of the 
Security Council members who based on evidence, especially the 
communication to it from the Foreign Ministry and the National 
Assembly of Czechoslovakia, found that there was no request by 
Czechoslovakia and that Czechoslovakia did not suffer any external 
attack.240 
  
Treaty, in Article 5, provides that “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of 
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and … they agree 
that, if such an attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self 
defense …, will assist the party or parties so attacked…”. See Text of the Treaty in (1949) Vol. 43, 
A.J.I.L., 159. 
 236. See Article 53 of the UN Charter. 
 237. See Goodrich Hambro and Simmons, supra note 69, 350. In such a case to determine 
which of Article 51 and Chapter III would be invoked would require a determination of the action 
taken under that treaty. The North Atlantic Treaty has been characterized as both a collective self 
defense treaty and a regional arrangement. See BOWETT, supra NOTE 54, 222. 
 238. See Jean Combacau,  The Exception of Self Defense in U.N. Practice, in ANTONIO 
CASSESE, ed., THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE, 9 (Dordrecht, 
1986). 
 239. On this and some of the collective self defense treaties, see CHRISTINE GRAY, 135-136. 
 240. See UN Doc. S/PV. 1441, at 31, 34 (1968). 
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D. THE ACTIONS OF ARMED BANDS AND IRREGULAR FORCES 
In its efforts to define what constitutes an armed attack justifying the 
exercise of the right of self defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case placed some 
reliance on the Definition of Aggression241 and came to the conclusion 
that the actions of armed bands, groups, and irregular forces or 
mercenaries amount to armed attack, where the scale of their effects is 
comparable to an actual armed attack and where they are attributable to a 
state.242 This determination by the court of what amounts to armed attack 
became imperative since a state which is making a claim of collective 
self defense can only succeed if there had been an armed attack on the 
alleged victim state to justify the aid given by that state. The court came 
to the conclusion that the acts of Nicaragua, either in respect of El 
Salvador, Honduras, or Costa Rica, did not amount to an armed attack, 
and therefore the use of force by the United States against Nicaragua was 
not justified as an action in collective self defense.243 The court went 
ahead to hold that in respect of an unlawful intervention, which falls 
short of an armed attack, a third state has no right of “collective” armed 
response comparable to “the right of collective self defense in respect of 
an armed attack.244 Assuming the alleged actions of Nicaragua were 
proved against them, they could attract only proportional counter 
measures against it from El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica alone, 
but certainly not from the United States, being a third state.245 The court’s 
position on the actions of armed bands and irregular forces seems to find 
favor in state practice.246 When the United States intervened in Lebanon, 
purportedly on the request of the latter and in the exercise of the right of 
collective self defense, both countries, initially, did not raise the issue of 
armed attack. It was at a later stage that Lebanon contended that Article 
51 did not envisage any difference between a regular army and irregular 
forces for purposes of exercising the right of collective self defense.247 
The pronouncement of the court seems to have reduced the controversy 
as to whether or not actions of irregular troops amount to armed attack in 
order to trigger the exercise of the right of collective self defense. 
  
 241. See Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 242. Nicaragua case, supra note 100, para. 195. 
 243. Nicaragua case, supra note 100, para. 236-238. 
 244. Nicaragua case, supra note 100, para. 211. 
 245. Nigaragua case, supra note 100, para. 249. 
 246. See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 I.C.L.Q. 712 
(1958); Gill, The Law of Armed Attack in the Context of the Nicaragua Case, 1 Hague Yearbook of 
International Law 30 (1988). 
 247. See SC 833rd meeting, 18 July 1958. 
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E. THE SUPPLY OF ARMS 
In the Nicaragua case, the United States had contended that the 
assistance rendered by Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador constituted 
armed attacks entitling it to act in collective self defense of El Salvador. 
The court, while disagreeing with the United States on this point, stated 
that assistance to rebels by way of provision of weapons or logistical or 
other support may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to 
intervention in the internal or external affairs of other states, but such 
assistance does not constitute armed attack.248 The court observed that in 
customary international law, the act of a state in providing arms to the 
opposition in another state cannot be classified as an armed attack. 
Relating this to the conduct of Nicaragua, the court noted that even if the 
provision of arms by Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador was at its 
apogee, it would still not have amounted to armed attack.249 The ruling of 
the court did not go down well with some commentators who faulted it 
and thought that the action of Nicaragua amounted to armed attack.250 
Other writers, however, were at one with the I.C.J.251 During the United 
States’ intervention in Lebanon in 1958, some states supported 
Lebanon’s claim to the right to request the United States to send its 
troops to Lebanon. This claim has been said not to amount to a 
justification of the exercise of right of collective self defense, but as 
recognition of the right of the United States to send its troops to assist the 
Lebanese government.252 
F. FRONTIER INCIDENT 
The I.C.J. in the Nicaragua case also made a distinction between armed 
attack and frontier incident. In the conclusion of the court, while an 
armed attack gives rise to the exercise of the right of individual and 
collective self defense, a mere frontier incident does not. This distinction 
is dependent on the gravity and effects of the alleged action upon which 
a claim of collective self defense is founded.253 This implies that an 
  
 248. Nicaragua case, supra note 100, para. 195. 
 249. Nicaragua case, supra note 100, para. 230. 
 250. See Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law and the National Defense, 126 Military Law Review 89, 94 
(1989); Nicholas Rostow, Nicaragua and the Law of Self Defense Revisited, 11 Yale Journal of Int’l 
L 437, 453 (1987); Norton Moore, The Nicaragua Case and the Deterioration of World Order, 81 
A.J.I.L. 151, 154 (1987); Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of 
World Order, 80 A.J.I.L., 43 (1986). 
 251. See Tom Farer, Drawing the Right Line, 81 A.J.I.L. 112, 113-114 (1987); James Rowles, 
“Secret Wars”, Self Defense and the Charter: A Reply to Professor Moore, 80 A.J.I.L. 568, 572 and 
579 (1986); Paul Reichler, and David Wippman, United States Armed Intervention in Nicaragua: A 
Rejoinder, 11 Yale Journal of Int’l L. 462, 470- 471(1985- 1986). 
 252. See CHRISTINE GRAY, supra note 80, 144. 
 253. Nicaragua case, supra note 100, para. 195. 
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armed attack has a more serious connotation and effect than a mere 
frontier incident. This bears resemblance to the proportionality 
requirement, and has been criticized as vague.254 This brings in the 
element of judgment and what criteria should be used in making this 
determination. Although the court established that Nicaragua had made 
certain trans-border incursions into Honduras and Costa Rica, which 
incursions were imputable to the government of Nicaragua, it could not 
find any material evidence which would have enabled it to ascertain the 
circumstances of those incursions or their motivations, and to determine 
whether they amounted, singly or collectively, to an armed attack by 
Nicaragua on either or both Honduras and Costa Rica, justifying the 
United States to act in collective self defense.255 It then means that 
another criterion used in labeling an act either as an armed attack or a 
frontier incident is the “circumstances and motivation” test. It is doubtful 
to what extent this test could be applicable. The distinction between 
armed attack and frontier incident has been criticized.256 It has been 
thought to be inconsistent with the requirement of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter,257 and as capable of engendering violence in international 
politics.258 However, the distinction is supported in some quarters.259 
Although Judge Schwebel gave a dissenting opinion in the final 
judgment of the court, especially with respect to the conclusion drawn by 
the court that there was no armed attack by Nicaragua against El 
Salvador to which the United States might respond in collective self 
defense, he agreed with the court on the distinction between armed attack 
and frontier incident.260 The court did not, however, elaborate on this 
distinction. 
G. LIMITATIONS OF THE RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF DEFENSE 
Although the right of collective self defense is inherent, there are 
circumstances under which its exercise can be limited. These 
circumstances could be seen as conditions for the exercise of such right. 
These conditions are put into consideration by the court when 
determining whether or not a particular claim to the right is justified. The 
  
 254. See Ian Brownlie, supra note 246, 366. 
 255. Nicaragua case, supra note 100, para. 231. 
 256. See DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF DEFENSE, 175, 3rd ed., (2001); 
Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 University of Chicago Law 
Review 113 (1986). 
 257. See Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and Self 
Defense, 81 A.J.I.L. 135 at 139 (1987). 
 258. See Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use of Coercion in the Post Cold- War World, 
Practices, Conditions, and Prospects, in DAMROSCH and SCHEFFER (eds.), LAW AND FORCE 
IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, 26, 39-40 (1991). 
 259. See Farer, Drawing the Right Line, 81A.J.I.L. 112 (1987). 
 260. See Schwebel, Dissenting Opinion, para. 15. 
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conditions were recognized and applied by the International Court of 
Justice in the Nicaragua case. One of the requirements is that the victim 
of an armed attack has to make a declaration that it has been attacked. 
The second requirement is that a state may not be entitled to the exercise 
of the right of collective self defense except there is a request to it for 
assistance by the victim state. On the first requirement, the court in the 
Nicaragua case noted that being the victim of an armed attack, it is only 
the state, which has been attacked that must form and declare the view 
that it has been so attacked. This duty cannot be delegated to any other 
state. The court reasoned that under customary international law, the 
state seeking to exercise the right of collective self defense is not 
permitted to make its own assessment as to whether or not the victim 
state has been attacked.261 The court went further to justify this 
requirement, stating that since it is the victim state that is the most 
directly aware of the armed attack, it is that state that would likely make 
public the fact of the armed attack on it.262 With regard to the second 
condition that the victim of an armed attack must have requested the 
assistance of the state which comes to its aid, the court observed that:  
In customary international law … there is no rule permitting the 
exercise of collective self defense in the absence of a request by 
the state which regards itself as the victim of an armed attack. 
The court concludes that the requirement of a request by the state 
which is the victim of the alleged attack is additional to the 
requirement that such a state should have declared itself to have 
been attacked. 
The court was of the view that when a state is attacked and wishes 
another state to come to its aid in collective self defense, it would usually 
make an express request in that regard.263 
It is important to note that the occurrence of the two requirements must 
precede the action taken in collective defense of the victim state. In other 
words, both the state’s declaration that it has been attacked and its 
request for assistance must take place before the third state can exercise 
its right of collective self defense for the benefit of the victim state. Thus, 
in the Nicaragua case, the court discovered, through evidence, that the 
United States’ action against Nicaragua, allegedly taken as an exercise of 
collective self defense in favor of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa 
Rica, had already commenced before El Salvador made a declaration that 
  
 261. Nicaragua case, supra note 100, para. 195. 
 262. Nicaragua case, supra note 100, para. 232. 
 263. Nicaragua case, supra note 100, para. 232. 
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it was a subject of armed attack and requested the assistance of the 
United States. In the case of Honduras and Costa Rica, there was no 
evidence to show that they had made either a formal declaration or had 
requested for the United States’ assistance.264 The two requirements do 
not apply retrospectively; neither can they be used to remedy a breach of 
the prohibition of the use of force, as the United States attempted to do in 
the Nicaragua case. They are not curative. 
The court came to the conclusion that the United States had failed to 
meet the condition sine qua non for the exercise of the right of collective 
self defense. Therefore, the court held that the defense of collective self 
defense did not avail it, and that it had violated the law prohibiting the 
use of force in international law.  
There is a general controversy as to whether the two conditions that for a 
right of collective self defense to arise there should have been both a 
declaration by the victim state that it had been attacked and a request for 
assistance by that state, are mandatory. For instance, it has been argued 
that once an armed attack has occurred against a state, the belief of the 
victim as to what has occurred is of no consequence because the state 
acting in collective self defense is equally subject to the armed attack.265 
This position seems to be founded on the view that for a third state to 
exercise the right of collective self defense it must have an interest of 
itself to protect arising from, say a treaty.266 But this view is not 
represented in general state practice. While it is conceded that in many of 
the cases where collective self defense has been claimed, there was a 
treaty relationship between the alleged victim and the aiding state,267 
there have equally been cases where such treaty relationship did not exist 
and this was not raised as a ground vitiating the claim of collective self-
defense.268 Judge Schwebel considered the two requirements as not 
formal,269 while Judge Jennings believed that a strict insistence on the 
conditions might be unrealistic.270 
Although the court in the Nicaragua case, apart from its reference to 
Article 3(2) of the Rio Treaty, did not cite any other authority to support 
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the requirement of a request for assistance by the victim state and cited 
no authority in respect of a declaration by the victim state that it has been 
attacked, it would not be baseless to argue that the two conditions are 
mandatory. The two conditions are the means through which the victim 
state can intimate the aiding state of its predicament. Therefore, they 
form the basis upon which the third state can come to assist the state 
which has suffered an armed attack. Besides, as the court said, and 
rightly too, it is only the victim state, the subject of the armed attack, that 
can correctly make the assessment of whether or not it has suffered an 
actual attack. Only that state has that competence because it is directly at 
the receiving end. After all, it is said that, “he who wears the shoes 
knows where they pinch.” Leaving the third state to decide when a 
victim state has suffered an armed attack and to decide on its own that it 
would assist the attacked state, will lead to the third state acting contrary 
to the wishes of the victim state and against the norms of international 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of self defense is riddled with controversies, central to 
which is the relationship between self defense under the UN Charter, 
precisely Article 51, and under customary international law. Here various 
issues have come into play, including “armed attack” and “anticipatory 
self defense,” in which may be subsumed the “preemptive doctrine.” 
While the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case seemed to 
have dealt in great detail with what constitutes an armed attack, the same 
cannot be said of anticipatory self defense. The exposition given by the 
court on the definition of armed attack is remarkable, although criticisms 
are still expressed by writers and commentators regarding some of the 
findings of the court. The Caroline incident (that is the most appropriate 
expression since it did not come before any formal arbitrator, court or 
tribunal) is the fulcrum of the argument for anticipatory self defense, and 
much of the legal literature is replete with reference to that incident. That 
authority is shaky in this regard. The conditions outlined in the Caroline 
incident upon which the claim to the legality of anticipatory self defense 
could be determined, strictly speaking, apply to self defense when an 
actual armed attack has occurred and not to anticipatory self defense. The 
conditions of necessity (which technically includes immediacy) and 
proportionality are more relevant in the determination of an occurrence 
of armed attack, than in a finding as to whether an armed attack is 
imminent. By way of concession, it might be agreed that the requirement 
of necessity can be applied in determining how imminent an attack is, as 
would warrant anticipatory self defense, though with some difficulty. But 
it is doubtful if the application of the condition of proportionality to 
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anticipatory self defense is practicable. How does one measure the 
proportionality of an action taken in anticipatory self defense in relation 
to an armed attack that has not been commenced let alone consummated? 
This, if not impossible, is extremely difficult. If Country A attacks 
Country B in self defense of an anticipated armed attack from Country B, 
what threshold will be applied by Country A in assessing the proportion 
of the yet-to-be unleashed attack? Whatever criterion that is employed 
will be clearly arbitrary. To this end, the Caroline incident does not offer 
a logical platform on which anticipatory self defense can be placed. The 
arguments put up by some writers in support of anticipatory self defense 
are strenuous attempts to stretch the scope of Article 51. It should be 
noted that the arms of Article 51 are not collapsible and like all non 
collapsible articles, any unreasonable pressure exerted on it would result 
in its breakage, which would be contrary to the intentions of the drafters 
of the United Nations Charter. 
Anticipatory self defense is not inferred from a reading or interpretation 
of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The term “armed attack” as used in that 
provision has no ambiguity and no attempt should be made to import any 
ambiguity into it. However successful a state’s claim to the use of self 
defense against a future attack may be, such claim cannot be clearly 
founded upon customary international law. From the trend of academic 
opinions, it appears the uncertainty and controversy surrounding the 
interpretation of Article 51 will continue unabated, with the 
sophistication of the nature of particular weapons. States will still be left 
with the liberty to determine what constitutes an armed attack and when 
an armed attack has occurred as to trigger the exercise of the right of self 
defense. With this state of affairs, the argument of those who doubt the 
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